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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This thesis is a study democratic transition paradigm in Mongolia from its 
communist past to its present status as a democratic country. The study is informed by 
the democratic transition paradigm by Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe Schmitter and 
by the work of Thomas Carothers, a critic of that paradigm. It examines the 
effectiveness of this theoretical work in guiding the study of an emergent democracy and 
in that context focuses on the role of elections as well as other internal factors, as well as 
historical and external factors relevant to democratic transitions.  
 The study finds that both transition paradigm and Carotherss work are useful 
guides to understanding the Mongolian case but also it finds flaws in each of them.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mongolia is a landlocked country in Central Asia bordering on the Russian 
Federation to the north and the Peoples Republic of China to the east, west and south. It 
has a land area of 1.6 million square kilometres making it the fifth largest country in 
Asia and the seventeenth in the world. Mongolia has a population density of only 1.5 
persons per km² - one of the lowest in the world, half the density of Canada. Ninety 
percent of the population is composed of Khalkh Mongols and Turkic-origin Kazakh 
people. The Mongolian Statistical Yearbook published in 2004 states that the current 
population of Mongolia is 2, 504,000 (2.5 million), of whom 893,400 live in 
Ulaanbaatar, the capital city.1 Of course, these are the official numbers, and the actual 
number of residents in Ulaanbaatar may well be higher. Out of the total population, 
1,110,300 (or 44 percent) are 19 years old or younger, and the number increases to 
1,376,440 (or 55 percent of the total population) if everyone under the age of 25 is 
included.2   
                                                
1 National Statistics Office of Mongolia, Statistics 2003 (Ulaanbaatar, 2003), 37. 
2 Ibid., 37. 
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Mongolia is divided into 21 provinces, and there are three principal cities. The 
capital city, Ulaanbaatar, is located in the north central part of the country and represents 
36 percent of the total population, while the rural population accounts for 42 percent of 
the total population. Another two big cities were established in the1960s by Russians 
closer to the former Soviet border. Darkhan is the second largest city and, the third 
largest, Erdenet, is primarily a mining city centered on the molybdenum industry, with 
one third of its residents originally from Russia.3 
Agriculture is the main sector of the economy besides industry and 
manufacturing. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics data for 
2004, it is estimated that 80 percent of the total land area -130 million ha - is suitable for 
agriculture in the broadest sense, but only 1.5 percent of this is used for crops and one 
percent is used for hay, while 97 percent is reserved for pasture.4  Mongolia remains a 
largely pastoral society with animal husbandry the main economic activity. Though 
agriculture is most important, the economy developed a significant industrial sector 
during the period of central planning before 1990. Industries such as leather, shoes, 
cashmere wool, as well as milk and bread are dependant on the agricultural sector in that 
it provides the raw materials for manufacturing. Thus, the two sectors of economy are 
highly correlated. Animal products, especially sheep and goat hides, are important 
exports.5 Mongolia is rich in natural resources, including copper, coal, molybdenum, 
fluorite, gold, iron ore, lead, phosphate, tin, oil and oil shale. Mongolia has large 
                                                
3 Thomas Robinson, Soviet Policy in Asia: the Military Dimension. Proceedings of the Academy of 
Political Science 36, 4 (July 1987), 151. 
Robert Rupen, Mongolia: Pawn of Geopolitics Relations with the Soviet Union, Current History, vol. 
81, no.475 (May 1982,) 215. 
4 Food And Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Statistical Yearbook 2004, Country Profiles, 
Mongolia, 1. 
5 Frederick Nixson, Bernard Walters, Transition to the Market Economy: Mongolia 1990-1998. 
International Journal of Economic Development, 2,1 (2000): 2. 
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deposits of graphite as well as construction and industrial materials such as marble, 
gypsum, limestone, granite, and quartz sands.6  A Mongolian-Russian joint venture 
copper company, Erdenet, produces copper concentrate for export. Gold exports have 
significantly increased and foreign mining companies have also increased investments.7 
In terms of its history, the establishment of the Mongol Empire reaches back 
seven centuries to the thirteenth century. In 1203 Chingis Khan united all Mongolian 
nomadic tribes and conquered the Central Europe and Southeast Asia, relying on his 
unique military leadership and tactics using fast-moving cavalry. Following the 
unification of Mongolian tribes, Kublai Khan, grandson of Chingis Khan, conquered 
China and established his Yang Dynasty (1271-1368).8  
By the end of the 17th century Mongolia lost its political independence to the 
Manchu-Ching Empire, Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Mongolia suffered more than two 
centuries under the oppression of the Manchu feudal state. In addition, Qing Dynasty 
administration policy divided Mongolia into an Outer and Inner region separated by the 
Gobi desert.9 In 1911, when the Manchu dynasty fell in China due to the anti-
Manchurian national liberation movement, Mongolia regained its independence and 
established the Bogd Khan (religious leader) monarchy (1911-1919). However, 
Mongolians did not fully realize at this time that independence was threatened by both 
the Republic of China and the Soviet Union.10 
                                                
6 United Nations Development Programme: Development Co-operation, 1995 Report. (Ulaanbaatar, 
1996). 
7 Bank of Mongolia, 1996 Annual Report of the Bank of Mongolia. (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 1997). 
8 Secret History of Mongolia. 
9 Robert Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1964). 
10 B. Baabar, Twentieth century Mongolia. (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1999). 
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Although Mongolia was the first Asian country to adopt Soviet style communism 
it was also the first to reject communism and Soviet domination.11 Mongolian 
independence, established in 1911, was not destined to last long. In 1921, during the 
civil war in Russia and with the support of Bolshevik Soviet troops, Mongolian 
nationalists in Ulaanbaatar defeated the Chinese troops who had been sent in 1919.12 On 
November 26th, 1924 (Independence Day), the Mongolians established the worlds 
second communist regime - the Mongolian Peoples Republic. This new regime 
remained relatively autonomous from Moscow until the late 1920s, when Stalin 
consolidated his power. Mongolia then adopted a Soviet-style political structure-and-
command economy. Because, Mongolia had always been supported by the Soviet 
Union, it maintained economic and political ties with the country. In fact these ties were 
so strong that Mongolia was sometimes called the 16th unofficial republic of the Soviet 
Union. Despite these long-standing ties to the Soviet Union, in 1989 Mongolia cast off 
communism and Soviet domination through the processes of a democratic movement. 
This transition spawned by the Mongolian democratic movement extends from 
the late 1980s to the present. The beginning of this period was marked by the Soviet 
Unions introduction of perestroika and glasnost which eventually contributed to the 
Soviet Unions collapse and led to tentative reforms in Mongolia. Furthermore, these 
events influenced intellectual leaders in Mongolia and contributed to the general 
liberalizing atmosphere. The initial reforms began at the state level in 1986 with 
restructuring economic policies and reforming the state bureaucracy and inefficiency: 
                                                
11 Joseph E. Lake, First Resident U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia, Perspectives on Early Political Change, 
The Asia Foundation Conference on Mongolias Political and Economic Transition: Challengers and 
Opportunities (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, September 2000), 3. 
12 B. Baabar. 
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Since 1990 Mongolia has advanced rapidly in transforming its controlled and directed 
economy, attempting to implement many Western-style deregulation, privatization, and 
market-liberalization measures.13 This geographical and historical overview of 
Mongolia sets up the background for this thesis. 
 
Thesis Statement 
This thesis will analyze the Mongolian transition from an authoritarian one-
party system to an open and competitive democratic political system. By critically 
assessing Mongolian history and political circumstances, this thesis will provide an 
analysis of the critical period of transition between these two political systems. This 
information will then be used to determine whether the countrys transition parallels the 
five assumptions of the transition paradigm. Mongolia is a country that has proven its 
democratic achievement within the last decade and has taken the steps necessary to 
promote further democratization.  
 
The Transition Paradigm 
In the late 1980s the world faced the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe leaving many countries somewhere between an authoritarian system of 
government and democratic system of government. Pinkney states that it is difficult to 
discuss the move from authoritarianism to democracy without the concept of transition. 
Countries are not authoritarian one day and democratic the next.14 Thomas Carothers 
points out that over the late 1980s and 1990s democracy promoters and academic 
                                                
13 Tray McGrath, Mongolias Bumpy Ride to Capitalism Transitions (December 1997): 1. 
14 Robert Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World  (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993),101. 
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analysts, such as Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe Schmitter, developed a 
democratization model called the transition paradigm.  This paradigm is associated 
with ODonnell and Schmitters work and analysis on the full extent of democratic 
transitions in the third world countries.15 The transition paradigm was very influential 
during the decade after 1990 but became less influential because its predictions had not 
been validated by experience.   
Carothers has led the challenge against this transition paradigm in an attempt to 
invalidate the paradigms five core assumptions.16 Carothers argues that the popular 
transition paradigm is limited in its actual applicability and, according to him, this 
popular paradigm is inherently flawed. Yet, Carothers does agree with the paradigm in 
that the transition to democracy is a gradual process. 
The first core assumption of the transition paradigm is that countries moving 
away from dictatorial regimes are automatically in a transition to democracy.17 
However, Carothers argues that not all regimes move to democracy even if there are 
democracy promoters. Moreover he states that many countries have not democratized at 
all.18 In fact, some transitional countries are between authoritarianism and democracy, or 
in the so-called foggy zone.19  
                                                
15 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
16 Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy XIII: 1 (January 
2002), 15. 
17 Ibid., 6. 
18 Ibid., 14. 
19 Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation: Election without Democracy. Journal of Democracy  
XIII: 2 ( 2002), 37. 
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The second assumption, developed by the United States Agency for International 
Developments (USAID) assessment system,20 is that there is a sequential process of 
stages in a transition to democracy. Carothers characterized these stages as follows: 
The first stage, the political opening, is a period of democratic turmoil and 
political liberalization which appears in the ruling dictatorial regime. The second 
stage, the political breakthrough, represents the collapse of the regime and the 
rapid emergence of a new, democratic system, with the coming to power of a 
new government through national elections and the establishment of a 
democratic institutional structure, often through the promulgation of a new 
constitution. After the political transition, we enter a difficult democratic 
consolidation stage, which is a slow but purposeful process in which democratic 
forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state 
institutions, the regularization of elections, and the strengthening of civil 
society.21  
 
Carothers argues that it is not inevitable that transitional countries will move steadily 
on this assumed path from opening and breakthrough to consolidation.22 Not all 
countries followed these stages, and although many countries did go through some of the 
stages, their transition to democracy can not be considered one-hundred percent 
successful.  
The third assumption that Carothers challenges concerns fair elections and 
addresses key elements of democratization. This assumption states that elections equal 
democracy. Carothers points out elections are not the only element of democracy; it is 
not true that wherever elections are held there is democracy, and, indeed, Most 
authoritarian regimes hold some form of elections.23 Furthermore, in many purportedly 
democratic countries, elections lack competitiveness and transparency and often involve 
election fraud such as stealing votes and jailing opposition leaders. For this reason, 
                                                
20 USAID, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators (Washington, D.C:USAID, 
August 1998). 
21 Carothers, 7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Schedler, 36. 
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international observers are sometimes sent to newly democratic countries in an attempt 
to prevent such serious fraud. Carothers attack on the third argues that simply holding 
elections will not necessarily lead to a legitimate democracy with improved political 
participation and a stable government. According to Carothers, in authoritarian regimes 
elections are not seriously monitored and are susceptible to corruption. In a functioning 
democracy, elections must be fair, competitive, and transparent. Elections alone can not 
deepen the root of democracy.24 
ODonnell has responded to Carothers critiques in an article entitled In Partial 
Defense of an Evanescent Paradigm where he defends the transition paradigm stating 
that elections are an important and valid goal; he states that Carothers is overly critical 
of the paradigm.25 He argues that regular elections are extremely important in forming a 
democracy, not because they will always lead to fair outcomes, but because elections 
mean a departure from authoritarian rule; elections signify progress.  
The fourth assumption states that social and economic factors affect the 
transition to democracy. Carothers argues that the transition paradigm does not 
adequately take into account ethnic, social and historical preconditions for democracy.26 
In his attack on the transition paradigm, he argues that economic, political, and social 
preconditions for democracy strongly affect the transition.  
The fifth assumption of the transition paradigm is that democracy promoters pay 
more attention to democracy-building than to state-building. The proponents of 
democracy assume that state-building is a part of the modification process from 
                                                
24 Carothers, 15-16. 
25 ODonnell, In Partial Defence of an Evanescent Paradigm, Journal of Democracy,  XIII:3 (July 
2002), 9. 
26 Carothers, 8. 
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authoritarian state to a democratic state.27 In contrast, Carothers argues that fundamental 
state-building, such as the introduction of new electoral and political institutions and 
strengthening civil society, is a very challenging process. Transition scholars must not 
ignore these challenges to democracy; they must focus on the issues involved in 
assisting state-building.28 As political attitudes change, democracy requires the active 
development of strong institutions, such as political parties, interest groups and 
legislatures. Thus many new political institutions must be introduced in the transition 
period. 
This thesis will examine Mongolias historical settings before the formal 
transition began in the 1990s and also the countrys experience with elections to 
determine whether Mongolia conforms to the transition model. Thus, this thesis will 
demonstrate the relevance of the transition paradigm. Making known the flaws within it 
sheds some light on whether Carothers critique is justified. By considering both the 
national presidential and parliamentary elections held since 1990 it will be determined 
whether Mongolian elections have been free and fair. This discussion will help to make 
predictions about the future of multi-party elections in Mongolia.  
 
Thesis Structure 
The thesis will review some of the key elements of Mongolias actual experience 
of transition and highlight some of the problems, both theoretical and practical, which 
have been encountered during this process. In doing so, this thesis will shed some light 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid.,16-17. 
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on the relevance of Carothers attack on the transition paradigm.  The basic structure of 
the remainder of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter Two will concentrate on the democratic transition of Mongolia and 
assess the validity of Carothers critique (underlying conditions affect the transition to 
democracy) of the paradigm, based on the second and the fourth assumption. In this 
chapter I will present the 15 years period of transition in order to understand the forces 
that contributed it to its dramatic conclusion. I will examine the nature of the changes 
that have resulted from the privatization of property and the stunning electoral defeat of 
the incumbent regime and its restoration in the 2004 national elections. The chapter will 
also cover political history, Soviet-Mongolian relations, democratization until 2004, the 
transition of the economy, the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Partys (MPRP) 
response to pro-democracy activity, the new constitution, the introduction of new laws, 
and the establishment of new political institutions.  
Chapter Three examines the electoral process and the elections that have taken 
place in Mongolia since 1990. This chapter will examine Carothers critiques of the third 
assumption (the importance of elections), and the fifth assumption (that many countries 
face state-building problems) by demonstrating that shallow elections have occurred in 
Mongolia during the transition process and that the state-building processes remain 
compromised by the former Soviet period and its structures.  Indeed, as Carothers 
predicts, Mongolia has faced challenges in state-building during the transition from a 
Soviet style political system to a democratic system. 
Lastly, Chapter Four will provide a conclusion to the thesis by bringing together 
the information discussed regarding the transition to democracy, democratic 
consolidation, and an analysis of the Mongolian electoral system. It will revisit my 
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arguments and relate my conclusions to the assumptions that remain in dispute between 
the proponents of the transition paradigm and Carothers attack on this paradigm. 
 
Methodology and Sources  
 The analysis which follows draws upon both secondary and primary sources. It is 
the latter which provides the original contribution of the thesis. I draw upon a wide 
range of government documents, statistical data on elections and parties, as well as key 
information on members of parliament, cabinet formation, and the crucial electoral 
results for all the key elections. This thesis is important because much of analysis has 
not yet appeared in academic literature.  
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CHAPTER II 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
 
Introduction 
Within a short period of time Mongolia has undergone a striking transformation 
from an authoritarian political system with a state controlled and directed economy to an 
open, competitive multi-party system with a free market economy. The country has 
moved through the stages of political protest, political liberalization and democratic 
breakthrough with free, open and competitive multi-party elections in a period of just 
over a decade. Mongolia has literally been shaken from its communist orientation to a 
new liberal democratic society. How can such a dramatic transition have taken place in a 
country seemingly isolated from the rest of the world?  
During seventy years of Soviet influence, Mongolia was arguably an unofficial 
dependent region of the Soviet Union.  At various points, the Soviet Communist Partys 
General Secretaries, including Stalin, made decisions that had major impacts on political 
and economic life in Mongolia.  The collapse of the Soviet Union was a historical 
precondition that led Mongolian politicians to consider adopting a democratic system, 
although some groups in the country had been considering the possibility of breaking 
away from Soviet control even earlier than the late 1980s.  
 13
The purpose of this chapter is to present the period of transition in order to 
understand the forces that drove Mongolia along its dramatic path. This is necessary so 
that an assessment can be made to determine whether Mongolias transition to 
democracy meets the transition paradigms first, second and fourth assumptions. With 
respect to these assumptions, an answer to three questions will be provided in this 
chapter: (1) Did Mongolia follow the sequential process outlined in the transition 
paradigm? (2) Did Mongolias historical preconditions affect its transition to 
democracy? (3) Did Mongolia fall into the grey zone between authoritarianism and 
democracy during the transition process? 
This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section is a historical 
analysis of Mongolia and communist party rule up to the late 1980s, as well as an 
analysis of Soviet influences (in the Gorbachev era of perestroika) to describe and 
explain Mongolia before 1989. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet 
Union led to the opening of archives and access to information kept secret for over 70 
years about the functioning of the communist party in Mongolia. This has allowed for 
new and detailed research into the countrys state operations during that period.  
The second section is an analysis of the transition period and of the nature of the 
dramatic changes that took place between 1990 and the present. This section will discuss 
the many obstacles and challenges that Mongolia faced during the transition, from the 
privatization of property to the stunning electoral defeat of the incumbent regime and its 
restoration in the subsequent national elections.  
 
 
 
 14
Mongolian Soviet Relations 
The geopolitical importance of Mongolia is the main reason for its political and 
military vulnerability; as scholar Ewing Thomas has stated, its position between the 
hammer and the anvil, 29 namely China and the USSR, puts Mongolia in a trying 
position. In this situation, Mongolian leaders have been required to make difficult 
choices between the competing influences of the two giant neighbors. Robert Rupen, a 
Mongolian Studies scholar, emphasized that: 
Both Russians and Mongols fear the Chinese simply because there are so many 
of them. Many Mongols also fear Russians, but the Russian threat is less 
direct. It is the very impossibility of massive Russian settlement in Mongolia 
that makes the Mongols to prefer the Soviet to the Chinese. The fact that 
Russians fear and oppose the Chinese as much as Mongols do makes it harder for 
the Mongols to realize the full extent of the Russian occupation of Mongolia- a 
spiritual, physical presence.30 
 
From this perspective, Rupen explains why Mongolian leaders sought Soviet protection, 
particularly in that Soviet policy seemed more tolerable than the Chinese policy of 
permanent settlement of Han Chinese in Mongolian territory. Indeed, the Soviet-Mongol 
alliance brought significant success for the Soviet Far Eastern policy planners. 
According to one of the Soviet Politburo Commission reports to Stalin on Mongolia, the 
Mongolian Peoples Republic (MPR) was significant for the Soviet Union in more ways 
than one. The report states that the Soviet Union should recognize Mongolia as the 
experimental field for a non-capitalist mode of development, as natural strategic 
protector for the southern Siberian border stretching from Manchuria to Chinese 
Turkestan, as an important meat and raw material supplier for the USSR, and finally as a 
                                                
29 Ewing Thomas, Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia 
1911-1921. (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1980). 
30 Rupen, How Mongolia is Really Ruled: A Political History of the Mongolian Peoples Republic 1900-
1978. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 128. 
 15
transit point for communications with China in case of military needs in Manchuria and 
in the Far East.31 This implies that the Soviets did not simply help Mongolia; instead, as 
a buffer zone, Mongolias role in Soviet policy was one of strategic importance. The 
Soviet Union did not care whether a Soviet-style policy structure would function in 
Mongolia. For all of these reasons, the role of the Soviet Union in Mongolia has been 
positive and negative in twentieth-century Mongolian history.  
After Mongolia abolished Chinese dominance of the region with Soviet 
assistance, it became closely allied with the Soviet Union in order to obtain protection 
from China. It is in the context of this relationship with the Soviet Union that Mongolia 
adopted a one-party communist government system. In 1924, the Mongolian Peoples 
Revolutionary Party (MPRP) adopted the Marxist- Leninist ideology and Mongolians 
established the communist regime  the Mongolian Peoples Republic. This marked the 
transition from a feudalist regime to a blueprint for socialism, bypassing capitalism. The 
Soviet Union came to dominate Mongolia and eventually asserted complete control 
over the political, economic and social life of the country, transforming Mongolia into a 
Soviet style communist republic.32 As Murphy points out: 
Since Mongolia became independent, all important organs have had Russians as 
advisers. To put it bluntly, it is the Russians who are directing everything. The 
Ministry of Finance, for example, has four Russian advisers and the Ministry of 
War had eight military advisers. The secret Police, which sees to the suppression 
of internal disorder, has six advisers and is actually headed by one. All the 
military training officers are Russians. The rest is manifest. 33 
 
                                                
31 George G. S. Murphy,  Soviet Mongolia, a Study of the Oldest Political Satellite. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1966), 4. 
32 Julia Hugh and Arnold Bilskie, An Examination of the Political and Economic Transition of Mongolia 
since the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Journal of Third World Studies 19: 12 (Fall 2002): 206. 
33 Murphy, 97. 
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Mongolia paid a high price for its deep desire to survive the struggle for 
independence and sovereignty by becoming the first communist Asian country after the 
emergence of the Soviet Union. However, the hoped-for independence and autonomy of 
the government were actually subsumed by the intense control of the Soviets. During the 
1930s, the strong political and ideological influence of the Soviets led to extensive 
purges, elimination of religion, forced herd collectivization, and suppression of 
traditional culture. For example, collectivization forced nomads to adjust to permanent 
community life styles, and this adjustment posed significant difficulties and hardship for 
communities used to a traditional nomadic life. But the collectivization policy failed in 
Mongolia, mostly due to severe losses in the herds which were the basis of the 
Mongolian economy. Bitter lessons were learned under communism during the great 
purges of 1930; Mongolia almost lost 10 percent of its population (intellectuals, male 
lamas, and liberal political leaders) in this Stalinist storm that overwhelmed the 
country.34 
In 1939, Khorloogin Choibalsan became Prime Minister, and largely gained the 
power to decide Mongolias fate for the next 50 years.35 Under his dictatorship 
Mongolia experienced political violence that paralleled the great purges carried out in 
the Soviet Union in the 1930s. In 1952, Kh. Choibalsan died and Yumjaagiin 
Tsedenbal36 was appointed General Secretary of the MPRP by the Soviet Communist 
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Party. The Soviet-educated new leader did not consider changing the governments 
heavy dependence on Soviet policy.  Instead, being an obedient follower of Soviet 
policies, Yu. Tsedendal acquiesced to increasingly greater control from the USSR.  
It is also interesting to note that in 1945, by Stalins fiat, Mongolia changed its 
classic Mongolian script into the Cyrillic alphabet. The beginnings of a new education 
system greatly expanded as new content accompanied new external forms: Marxist 
Leninist indoctrination pervades the Mongolian educational system.37 Many Mongolian 
leaders and top officials were educated in the USSR and fluent in Russian, and, further, 
Russian was compulsory in Mongolian schools.  
Following the emergence of Mongolia from Soviet control there were initially 
strong feelings of bitterness and regret for the 70 year of totalitarian rule, however, today 
people have fewer doubts about the decisions leaders made in the 1920s realizing the 
political and economic necessities of the time. Mongolia had an unpredictable future at 
that time. In short it faced the possibility of vanishing as a cultural and political entity. 
David Dallin, referring to the positive aspects of Soviet-style development in Mongolia, 
points out that roads, schools, literacy, doctors, and medicine were brought to the 
nation These effects of Soviet rule will be lasting; a return to the old ways of life is 
out of the question.38 While the Soviet-Mongol relationship was certainly not one 
between equals, it was nonetheless welcomed by Mongolians because it severed Chinese 
domination of Mongolia and enabled the countrys formal independence. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                           
strongly accused him of poor leadership. See Leonid Shinkarev, Kh. Mergen translation Yu. Tsedenbal 
and Filatova, (Munkhin Useg Press: Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2004). 
37 Rupen, Mongolia: Pawn of Geopolitics Relations with the Soviet Union, 218. 
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restoring independence of the country from China was the greatest accomplishment of 
Mongols since the great successes of Chingiss Mongol Empire. 
Near the end of the twentieth century, two dramatic political trends appeared in 
the Soviet Union: the transition towards democracy and the collapse of communism. 
Furthermore, the Cold War had come to an end. At this time dramatic and historic 
changes swept across Mongolia. These changes had huge impacts on political life, the 
economy and society, and the national structure of Mongolia.   
For example, 1984 was year of change because a comparatively young new 
leader, Jambyn Batmunkh, replaced Yu. Tsedenbal as General Secretary of the MPRP. 39   
When J. Batmunkh delivered his first official speech at the special plenum of the MPRP 
Central Committee in August 23, 1984, he promised to continue strengthening the 
relationship with the Soviet Union.40 The new leaders address on this issue stated that: 
MongolianSoviet relations are distinguished by mutual trust, and our 
cooperation is characterized by its grand scale and great creative strength. The 
strengthening in every way of these really fraternal mutual relations with the 
CPSU and the Soviet Union was and will remain the principal line of our party 
and state.41  
 
In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. This leadership change extensively influenced Mongol-Soviet 
relations. The new leaders faced the difficult challenge of transforming their countries to 
improve political and economic stability and living standards. 
Gorbachev aimed at restructuring Soviet foreign policy, installing new 
leadership, and rekindling Sino-Soviet relations. It is critical, however, to note that 
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Gorbachev remained committed to socialism.  As he stated in his Renewal and New 
Thinking:  
 
 
We want to deepen socialism and thats why we aim to expand democracy 
The historical experience showed that stagnation might occur in a socialist 
society and eventually result in a serious social and political crisis It is 
important that socialism is capable to accomplish revolutionary changes as it is 
an energetic society by nature.42  
 
Thus Gorbachev believed socialism would survive no matter what crises and conflicts 
arose. At the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 
1986, Gorbachev criticized Soviet foreign and economic development policies and 
announced new initiatives in foreign policy and economic reform entitled perestroika 
and glasnost.43 General Secretary J. Batmunkh attended the 27th Congress as an observer 
in Moscow. Back home, at the 19th MPRP Congress in May 1986, J. Batmunkh 
introduced party members to Gorbachevs new thinking policy, and presented a 
Mongolian equivalent of perestroika and glasnost that reflected the Soviet leaders 
initiatives. J. Batmunkhs initial political reform was focused on developing new 
leadership, party restructuring, administrative reforms and economic development. He 
pointed out that new party leadership and new ideas would improve the efficiency of 
state management which would in turn accelerate the countrys development. Therefore, 
he brought about a major replacement of the party leadership to remove the dead wood 
inside the party.  
The terms perestroika and glasnost brought into Soviet and Mongolian political 
discourse ideas about democracy. Freedom, transparency, social integrity, human rights, 
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a free media, and free markets were new to Mongolians. These ideas fomented a very 
active social, economic, and political life in Eastern European countries, but also in 
Mongolia. This shift in policy provided a great opportunity for Mongolians to 
understand the functional realities of capitalism and to make important decision for the 
countrys move towards democracy. However, in the chaotic transition period, the 
people of Mongolia were confused about the rationality of democracy and a free market 
economy, although they had hope that these might improve the quality of life.  The 
transition itself was a gradual process; it was not a process whereby overnight an 
authoritarian country became a democratic country.  
Gorbachev officially announced his new position on the normalization of Sino-
Soviet relations in an important speech on Asian security in Vladivostok on 28 July, 
1986. In this speech he announced the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops44 from 
Mongolia along the Sino-Soviet border to meet Chinas condition for normalization of 
relations.45 He also emphasized that The Far Eastalways has been and always will 
remain close to the hearts of Soviet people.46  
General Secretary J. Batmunkh and other delegates met with Gorbachev after 
this speech. Wishnick claims that part of Gorbachevs new foreign policy was to 
gradually reduce the Soviet military presence by withdrawing troops in Asia to some 
extent, and improving Soviet relations with Asian states in the region in areas of security 
and political-economic cooperation.47  Prior to Gorbachevs Vladivostok speech, J. 
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Batmunkh had articulated the Mongolian perspective in his 1985 official visit in the 
USSR: 
Mongolia pursues a policy of normalizing interstate relations with the PRC on 
the basis of such universally recognized principles of peaceful coexistence as 
good-neighborliness, mutual respect for sovereignty, and noninterference in each 
others internal affairs. We are following with interest the progress of the 
consultation on normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.48 
 
 
Soon after the Vladivostok speech, the Mongolian government gave its support 
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia to improve security in Asia and to 
strengthen foreign relations and bilateral relations with the Peoples Republic of China.49 
Because Gorbachev continued to expand Soviet influence in the Asian region including 
with China, Mongolia began to worry about its national security and economic 
difficulties. Therefore, Mongolia expanded its relations with other communist and non-
communist countries. Gorbachevs foreign policy initiative had opened the window to 
the world for Mongolia50 and in January 1987, Mongolia established diplomatic 
relations with the United States.  These new relations had promising implications for 
Mongolia upgrading its profile on the world stage. 
By November 1987, J. Batmunkh had developed a very critical view of 
Mongolian administrative and economic structures and, generally, of the political system 
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which Mongolia had inherited from the leadership of Kh. Choibalsan and Yu. 
Tsedenbal. As a result, he initiated the implementation of various political and economic 
reform programs. This decision was a positive response to Gorbachevs political and 
economic reforms and Asian initiatives.  
During December 1988, the fifth plenum of the MPRP Central Committee 
highlighted the second stage of the tentative reform process. Gorbachevs reform 
policies inspired political reform and social changes, especially party reform, 
encouraging openness in the partys inner politics.51  Party leader J. Batmunkh believed 
that the political and economic stagnation were due to the ex-communist leaderships 
shortcomings. Based on Gorbachevs ideas, Mongolian leaders conducted their own 
form of perestroika through administrative and economic restructuring and introduction 
of glasnost in the form of tolerance for a free media without communist party control, 
along with transparency in the political system. Perestroika in Mongolia went through 
several stages: perception, implementation, and modification (adaptation).52  
J. Batmunkh interpreted perestroika in the context of restructuring peoples old 
ways and old thinking in order to initiate processes of renewal and restructuring 
within the new party leadership.53 He proposed a reform agenda to reduce party 
membership in order to improve its quality and to make unions and youth organizations 
independent. In other words, he encouraged civil society, non-governmental 
organizations, and their engagement in party and state issues. Later J. Batmunkh claimed 
in his Never Allow the Use of Force in Decision Making that the reform he introduced at 
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the time was not about abolishing socialism, but was about eliminating mistakes caused 
by the flaws of socialism thereby deepening socialism and moving it in the right 
direction.  
Moreover, according to Alan Sander, Mongolias leaders faced an uphill 
struggle in tackling the countrys economic and social problems, including low 
productivity, a shortage of hard currency, the prospect of aid falling off in real terms as 
well as the rising prices and poor quality of imports from CMEA countries.54 
Therefore, in the next stage of the reform, initiated at the 1989 seventh plenum of the 
MPRP Central Committee,  
J. Batmunkhs speech introduced a new program on labor productivity, agricultural 
development and development of the food industry.55 Moreover, the new Law on State 
Enterprise (1989) led to the establishment of more new food processing enterprises to 
produce such consumables as bread, processed pork, soft drinks and thus to increase 
domestic consumption under Mongolias Food Program.56 Besides economic 
developments, commissions were set up to deal with these numerous reforms by 
revising the MPRP Program, drafting amendments to the MPRP Rules, and to re-editing 
the MPRP Constitution.57 
Another important event in 1989 was the actual withdrawal of Soviet troops;58 
the USSR had begun planning the withdrawal of its military forces from Mongolia in 
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1987.59 Unfortunately, this withdrawal left Mongolia an increasing number of empty 
factories, rusting bulldozers, potholed roads, and buses that were abandoned for want of 
spare parts. Moreover, all Soviet technical advisers left and the flow of economic 
assistance also ceased.60 Soon after, Mongolia experienced a very difficult economic 
crisis due to its dependence on both the Soviet Union and the Council on Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) aid. 61 The challenge now was to implement suitable 
economic reform for the centralized command economy of Mongolia. This process 
proved very difficult; therefore, Mongolia followed the Russian example. [T]he initial 
objective of Mongolias reform process was to revitalize the socialist economy rather 
than replace it.62 
 The loans and assistance from the USSR had continued flowing to Mongolia in 
the 1980s and the country appeared to be developing well. However, in reality, 
Mongolia was experiencing a deep economic and social crisis because nearly 95 percent 
of Mongolias trade was with the Soviet Union, and most of the rest with its allies in the 
CMEA. Most of the economic assistance consisted of loans amounting to about 10 
billion transferable rubles (TR) or about US$1.5 billion.63 All these loans created a huge 
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debt to the Soviet Union at the end of 1989. M.S. Fish argues that Mongolia embarked 
on its transition with the lowest standard of living in the communist world, matched only 
by Albania.64 Mongolia was severely dependant on the Soviet economy: 
The effect of the collapse of the Soviet economy was especially hard on 
Mongolia, as between a third and half of Mongolias budget came from Soviet 
aid. Most Soviet technicians and experts left, and those who remained demanded 
payment in hard currency. Withdrawal of Soviet support created shortages of 
energy, raw materials, and spare parts, which in turn caused factories to close, 
construction to halt, and unemployment to rise.65 
 
The withdrawal of Soviet troops was finalized just before Gorbachevs visit to China in 
spring of 1989. On May 15th 1989 Gorbachev visited China to attend the first Sino-
Soviet summit in thirty years.66 When he arrived in Beijing, a massive student-led pro-
democratic demonstration took place on Tiananmen Square. In response to this event, 
Gorbachev addressed the media to indicate that he would support the reform process in 
Socialist countries. The Russian daily newspaper Pravda stated that Gorbachev said 
that he would not judge the protest, he would use political methods if such events 
occurred in Moscow. He defended Socialist countries experiencing unrest as they try to 
reform.67  There is a significant amount of speculation as to why the Mongolian 
government simply abandoned communism and the one-party system in the late 1980s. 
Gorbachevs strong position on the reform indicated to the Mongolian communist 
leaders the need to encourage reform in Mongolia. 
In roughly five years of political leadership, J. Batmunkh was able to manage the 
transition to democracy, thereby avoiding the political violence occurring in China, and 
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these measures ensured the future of a peaceful transition to democracy in Mongolia.68  
His efforts strengthened the pro-democracy features of the political landscape in 
Mongolia. With his academic background in economics and education, J. Batmunkh was 
a pragmatic, flexible, far-sighted, open-minded, and cautious senior politician who 
managed to avoid major disruption in Mongolian politics. Mikhail Gorbachevs 
domestic reforms and new thinking in Soviet foreign policy provided the impetus for 
Mongolias own political and economic transformation in the late 1980s. At various 
points, the Soviet Communist Partys general secretary, including Stalin, had made 
decisions that had a major impact on political and economic life in Mongolia. 
Gorbachevs reforms led Mongolias leaders to consider adopting a democratic system 
and to embrace a more nationalistic approach to governing. J. Batmunkh carefully 
planned the reform process and positively responded to Gorbachevs initiatives. His 
actions illustrate that he was a successful and powerful leader. Yet, after all the years of 
sincerely working for the state, the state did not value his efforts while he was alive.69  
No matter how well the leaders solved state issues, unpleasant lives and reputations 
awaited for many of them after retirement from office. 
In sum, the relationship between Mongolia and the Soviet Union provides a 
historical background to the period in which Mongolia began its formal transition to 
democracy. Carothers critique stated that the fourth assumption of the transition 
paradigm did not take into consideration the social and historical preconditions of a 
countrys transition to democracy. He emphasized the importance of these 
preconditions. The Mongolian experience confirms this importance because without the 
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external factor of the Soviet Union, it is safe to assume that Mongolias transition to 
democracy would have been quite different.  
 
The Democratic Transition Period: Dramatic Change  
This section examines who participated in the democratic movement to shed 
some light on the transition process and how its tumultuous changes took place. With the 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, Mongolia faced dramatic changes in 
its entire system due to its highly ideological, authoritarian party rule that had lasted for 
seventy years. The economy was strictly controlled and directed by the State. Yet 
Mongolia has now become an open, competitive multi-party system disclaiming the 
socialist model and has introduced free market reforms including a major privatization 
movement. Thus within roughly a decade Mongolia experienced tumultuous political 
and economic change. This transition period was severe. Mongolian people have gone 
though many hardships and challenges, making progress step by step. Events in 
December of 1989 and early 1990 marked a crucial moment in Mongolian history when 
the country could have either moved towards democracy or remained communist. 
The Democratic Transition in the 1980s 
First of all, beginning in the 1980s, the younger generation of party elite 
offspring was quite responsive to Gorbachev's policies, because many of them had been 
educated in the Soviet Union during this period. This situation created a generational 
power struggle in the party between the elite and its offspring. The young Mongolians 
who came in the mid to late 1980s brought back with them the reform ideas introduced 
by Mikhail Gorbachev.  
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Most of the officials were in their 50s and 60s, and most of the demonstrators 
were in their 20s or early 30s. Many of these scions of privileged families had 
received their educations in the USSR or Eastern Europe and had been exposed to 
the new ideas swirling around in the freer Soviet era of the 1980s. All knew one or 
another of the Slavic languages, and several were comfortable in English and 
German, offering them exposure to Western newspapers, radio, and television.70  
 
Students began advocating freeing the media from party control and engaged in a 
broad range of discussions about human rights, and multi-party elections. They had 
secret meetings to discuss potential social and political changes. Moreover, much 
propaganda directed against the government and its policy was posted in the main 
streets, in downtown Ulaanbaatar, encouraging people to support changes in the political 
system and demand freedom, and human rights.  They launched slogans such as 
Mongols, mount up! calling for change, because the horse is a symbol of the armed 
Mongol man.  As the History of Mongolia states at the end of 1989 many students and 
young generation formed political groups, clubs and unions such as the Orchlon Club, 
the Shine Ue (New Generation) Group, the Ertunts (Universe) Debate Club, the Zaluu 
Ediin Zasagchdin (Young Economists Club) and the Devshilted Zaluuchuudin Evsel 
(Progressing Youth Union).71 All these newly formed organizations were the foundation 
of the future political parties. 72  There were, of course, many others that did not 
coalesce to form political parities. 
Later in February 1989, one of these unions, the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth 
Union, organized its second convention for consultation on the current political situation 
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and the challenges that faced society.73 They agreed to form a new Youth Union to 
contribute to the reform process. Following the convention, ten intellectuals influenced 
by developments in Eastern Europe, who already had been involved in the youth clubs 
and unions activities, established the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) on February 
18, 1989.74 The Union was not registered by the government. It had only nine members 
and was without a leader. According to an MDU brochure, S. Zorig, Ts. Elbegdorj, 
Amarsanaa, Da. Ganbold, B. Bat-Uul,75Ts. Enkhtuvshin, D. Ninj,  Nyamsuren, 
Tsogtsaikhan, Sukhbaatar76 were the founders of the MDU. These individuals were 
leaders of the democratic movement.77 The formation of the MDU was the first crucial 
step toward establishing civil society to challenge the communist state and its 
bureaucracy. In addition, the MDU establishment was a crucial political opening stage in 
Mongolias development towards democracy. From February on, the newly formed 
union held several gathering and rallies in Ulaanbaatar. Estimates of the number of the 
people who attended each rally ranged from 250 to more than 1,000.78 
Secondly, the December 10, 1989 International Human Rights Day 
demonstration had a great impact on the foundation of the new civil society in Mongolia. 
Rossabi states that the scene observers in Government House witnessed on December 
10, 1989, both surprised and shocked them. As snow drifted down gently, two hundred 
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people marched around with banners and signs calling for the elimination of 
bureaucratic oppression as well as a promise to implement perestroika.79 Slogans and 
banners at the rallies and demonstrations raised public awareness and people began 
seeking profound changes. The signs and banners carried such slogans as Democracy is 
our goal, Democracy in your hands, and Solidarity for human rights.80  Opposition 
groups carefully organized pro-democratic protest on International Human Rights Day 
taking into account the risk of being arrested and avoiding possible retribution by the 
government such as that occurred in Chinas Tiananmen Square massacre.81 Hundreds 
of protesters carried signs like End of Communist Experiment openly criticizing 
communist party leaders and the ruling party.82  
Leaders of the democratic movement were pleased and encouraged by the 
turnout, seeing two thousand protestors joining them in the demand for multiparty 
system, free elections with universal suffrage, human rights, freedom of the press, 
religion, freedom of speech, freedom to travel, a free market economy, private 
ownership, and top down government restructuring. According to the Democratic Party 
Archive materials the original slogans posted were: 
• We need a multi-party system 
•  a legal state 
• Respect for human rights 
• Freedom of the press 
• The MPRP restricts human rights and freedom 
• The MPRP rules the country through centralized administrative methods and 
thus leads it into poverty.83 
 
                                                
79 Rossabi, 2. 
80 With Official Permission, Change Stirs Mongolia, A6. 
81 Sodnomdarjaa,  209. 
82 Jonathan Sikes, Yet Another Soviet Outpost Feeling the Pangs of Freedom, Insight on the News, 
vol.6, no.14 (1990):34. 
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Heaton emphasizes that  
[t]he ruling party initially responded by promising to undertake reform. MPRP 
General Secretary Jambyn Batmokh stated in early February that the party would 
hold a dialogue with the MDU. Other regime leaders also discussed the need for 
the development of a multiparty system and popular elections for the Great 
People's Hural (GPH), Mongolia's chief legislative body. The communists, 
however, appeared to be in no hurry.84  
 
For the opposition forces, the December rally was the most courageous 
development in the last several decades of Mongolian history. The long repressed 
Mongolians hoped for a leader with vision and independence, someone who would 
represent their pride rather than their domination.85 People saw this leadership quality 
in Sanjaasurengin Zorig. [Zorig stated that] we have opened [peoples] eyes for the first 
time in decades. The people do not react to our movement because they are forced to. 
They react because they feel compelled to.86 The outcome of the demonstration 
empowered the MDU to submit a first citizens petition of political demands to the 
communist leadership.  
This petition was a remarkable result of the rally, and it stated that: 
we are deeply concerned about the process of reforms, the present social, 
political and economic situation of the country and the slow reaction to the 
urgent problems. Therefore, we demand the following: 
 
A. That amendments be made to  the Constitution of the Mongolian Peoples Republic 
to: 
1. Stop one-party rule of the state 
2. Respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
3. Reorganize the Great Peoples Hural into a permanently functioning 
      parliament 
B. That restructuring and reforms be implemented to: 
1. Renew the electoral  system and hold elections in the first half of 1990 
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85 Sikes, 35. 
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C. That the socialist development of the Mongolian Peoples Republic be evaluated to: 
1. Set up a public commission to commit for trial the people who nourished the  
     willfulness of Kh. Choibalsan and Yu. Tsedenbal 
2. Rehabilitate hundreds of patriots, laymen, and clergymen who had been 
     repressed and pay compensation to their families87 
 
This time the MPRP decided to compromise with reformers to avoid a domestic crisis 
and responded positively to the principles of a multiparty system, and basic human 
rights to be implemented within five years. However, young democrats were not willing 
to wait; they were in a hurry to undertake profound changes. Soon after the foundation 
of the MDU, other civil society organizations such as the Democratic Socialist 
Movement and the New Progressive Movement began to form.88 Their purpose was to 
advocate democracy, a free press and democratic change in Mongolia and to leave 
behind the Soviet influence. All the activities of the MDU and other democratic forces 
increased the political awareness of Mongolians as never before.89 Topics including 
getting rid of the Soviet influence and being able to make ones own decision were 
discussed among the people for many years and this was probably the perfect moment to 
express these views openly. On the other hand having dutifully followed by every twist 
in the Soviet party line for decades, [people] are now having to negotiate perhaps the 
most difficult turns so far: glasnost and perestroika.90 
 
 
The Democratic Transition from 1990 to 1992 
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The first coalition government began its full-scale program of economic and 
political system transformation, as set in out its concrete reform strategy. Privatization of 
state property was the main reform of the economic transition. The Privatization Law 
passed in May 1991 entitled people to participate in privatization through a voucher 
system. 
The privatization program has been a key element in Mongolias reform program 
and the move to a market economy. The program was initiated in October 1991 
and was based on a voucher system similar to that used in a number of other 
transitional economies (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania). The decision to 
use the voucher system was a consequence of the low level of domestic financial 
savings, the lack of a well-developed capital market and the absence of adequate 
means of valuing state enterprises assets.91  
 
The process proceeded as follows: In September 1991, the prices under control were 
liberalised. Further liberalization took place in March 1992, leaving only public utilities, 
transportation, housing rents, selected medicines, flour, bread and rationed vodka subject 
to price controls.92 The Mongolian Stock Exchange was established in February 1992.  
Privatization of livestock herds was implemented and reached 80 percent of the entire 
herd animals between 1991 and 1993. Following privatization, the livestock number 
increased from 25.9 million in 1990 to 33 million in 1997.93 The ensuing urban-rural 
migration was reflected in a slight decrease in the urban share of Mongolias population: 
58 percent urban and 42 percent rural according to 2003 statistics, compared to 60 
percent urban 40 percent rural before.  
During these years the government also established the State Property 
Committee, passed a new law on State and Local Property, and started a further and 
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ambitious privatization program.94 A housing privatization program privatized 
residential units and apartments and transferred them to current residents free of charge. 
As a result, by 2001 [a]bout 90% of residential units in apartment buildings had been 
privatized.95  
The Democratic Transition from 1992 to 1996 
The key event in this period was the adoption of a new constitution leading 
towards a liberal democracy. Mongolias first constitution had been adopted after 
independence in 1924 with revisions made to it in 1940 and 1960 (both modeled on the 
Soviet Constitution of 1939). Following the formation of the new government in 
October 1990, a Constitution Drafting Commission headed by President Punsalmaa 
Ochirbat started working on a fourth Constitution.96 The Constitution Drafting 
Commission was divided into a four groups reflecting the Constitutions main themes: 
human rights, state affairs, economic, social and political matters, and legal and 
constitutional issues. The Constitutions first draft was published in June 1991. Though 
many people argued that Mongolia should have a parliamentary system, the first draft 
called for a strong presidential system and a single chamber parliament. 
Mongolians drafted the new Mongolian Constitution with foreign advice. It was 
adopted on January 13, 1992 within one year of its introduction.97 The six chapters that 
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make up the Constitution address the matters of independence and territorial integrity, 
human rights and freedom, the state structure, local administration functions, the 
Constitutional Court, and amendment of the Constitution. The new Constitution 
established a democratic political system with a free market, and also changed the 
structure of the state institutions in that the final version called for a mixed political 
system loosely modeled on Frances Fifth Republic.98  
Chapter Three of the Constitution, dealing with the state structures, states that the 
supreme legislative power is the State Great Hural. According to this chapter, the 
President is Head of State, symbolizes the peoples unity and has the power to veto 
parliamentary legislation. Yet, the veto can be overturned by a two-thirds majority of 
the State Great Hural.99  It further states that the President is also the head of the 
National Security Council and the commander of the armed forces. The prime minister, 
on the other hand, serves as head of the government and directs a cabinet drawn from the 
State Great Hural. 
The new Constitution empowered the Constitutional Court (Constitutional 
Tribunal) as a high court that deals primarily with constitutional law. The Constitutional 
Court consists of nine members, including a chairman, appointed for a six-year term.  Its 
main authority is to rule on whether or not challenged laws are in fact unconstitutional 
and therefore in conflict with constitutionally established rights and freedoms.  
However, a number of issues, such as the State Great Hural general elections scheduled 
                                                
98 Ginsburg, 466. 
99 Constitution of Mongolia, 1992, Aricle33 (1). The English version of the Constitution was obtained 
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in June 1992 and the presidential election to follow in June 1993, were dealt with by the 
Supplementary Law on Implementation of the Constitution during the transition period. 
Democracy requires the development of strong institutions such as political 
parties, and interest groups. In accordance with the new Constitution, other laws were 
passed as revisions, amendments and changes of existing law on political parties, a law 
on parliamentary and presidential elections, and a law on local elections. These newly 
passed laws reflected far more democratic practices and establishment of democratized 
institutions. For example, the political parties law allowed the establishment of parties 
which could run in the elections.  Moreover, interest groups have blossomed.  For 
example, the NGO community has grown dramatically with more than 1,800 registered 
by the Ministry of Justice in 2000.100 Therefore, Mongolian citizens have several 
channels for representing their interests, including national NGOs. This demonstrates the 
empowerment of civil society in Mongolia to support the democratization process. 
Mongolia was one of the most interesting of the economies in transition from 
central planning to a free market economy during the 1990s. Massive external 
shocks in 1989 and 1990 led unexpectedly to a decline in the countrys gross 
national product. At the same time as Mongolia embraced democracy it adopted 
rapid economic reform, which worsened the economic situation and led to high 
inflation.101 
 
In the June 28, 1992 parliamentary elections, the MPRP won 71 out of 76 seats and 
voter turnout was 95.6 percent. The MPRP used the economic crisis situation in the 
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election to win the Democrats. This stunning victory of the communists was a result of 
them blaming the opposition:  
In the campaign, the conservative elements of the communist party attempted to 
blame the economic collapse on the new democratic process and the opposition, 
and exploited popular outrage at a banking scandal in which central banking 
traders with ties to opposition figures had squandered the countrys entire gold 
reserves through speculations.102  
 
Despite the fact that both the painful reforms and the banking scandal had occurred 
under the MPRP government, linking the opposition and an uncertain period of change 
to the scandal was an effective strategy and the MPRP won 93 percent of the seats. A 
new government was formed under Prime Minister P. Jasrai, who maintained the basic 
policy orientation towards economic reforms.103 
The first presidential election was held in June 1993. Pulsalmaa Ochirbat won 
the election to serve as a President for another four years term (see Chapter 3 for 
detailed election results). His government embarked on an ambitious, but in the short 
term painful program to achieve the transition from central planning to a market 
economy by 1994. As we saw above, prices were liberalized, the currency was devalued, 
a new banking system and stock exchange were established, and privatization began. At 
this time Mongolia joined the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development 
Bank. By 1996 Mongolias inflation was greatly reduced, and privatization moved 
apace.  
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In April 1994 there was an opposition-led hunger strike in the main square to 
protest against the government under the leadership of Prime Minister P. Jasrai, and the 
exposure of yet another banking scandal in the fall. The 41 hunger strikers with their 
crowd of supporters demanded the resignation of the P. Jasrai government and the 
dissolution of the Parliament, alleging bribery and corruption. Essentially, the strike was 
about freeing the media. The strike lasted for twelve days. Even though one of the 
strikers demands was to free national radio and television the rural population in 
Mongolia had access to only government controlled radio and television. The 
governments continued control over television and radio was of vital importance in a 
country where most of the rural population did not receive newspapers. During the 
strike, President P. Ochirbat played role as an ombudsman-mediator. He tried to bring 
democracy into practice by protecting both public and government interests. As a result 
of pressure from him, the government agreed to propose a free media law to allow 
public demonstrations and the revisions of the election law. In the meantime the crisis 
was resolved by April 25th without the government having to resign.  
In conclusion, Mongolia went through a very difficult period for approximately 
three years in the early 1990s as it suffered financially. As a result, Mongolia turned for 
assistance to the West and international donor agencies as the Mongolian government 
began the process of change. This international support helped Mongolia recover from 
the sharp economic crisis. In the meantime, GDP showed positive growth, and the 
economy improved gradually. 
 
 39
The Democratic Transition after 1996: The Pendulum Swings Again104 
 The 1996 election brought a new perspective in the politics of the newly 
democratizing Asian nation with a culture so much different from that of Western 
culture. In 1996 the pendulum swung the other way.105 The Democratic Union 
Coalition, led by Radnaasumberel Gonchigdorj, defeated the MPRP.106 It won more than 
50 of the 76 assembly seats. The elections for parliament at the end of June 1996 ended 
the 75 years of Communist rule. After its defeat, the MPRP had to recast itself as a 
center-left social democratic party. This marked a peaceful alteration from communism 
to democratization. 
Mendsakhany Enhsaikhan, the 41-year-old democratic leader, was appointed as 
Prime Minister.107 Economic liberalization was seen as a necessary step toward a 
democratic polity. The new government started its reform by liberalizing energy prices 
and eliminating all tariffs. Coal, electricity, and thus energy prices almost doubled. The 
people were strongly affected by the price liberalization. 
During 1996, industrial production fell by twenty five percent. After big factories 
and enterprises had been privatized many of them closed down due to unsuitable 
economic and market conditions. Meanwhile, social conditions worsened. According to 
Statistics Mongolia, the percentage of people living under the poverty line increased to 
thirty percent and the number of homeless street children increased in Ulaanbaatar. The 
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UNDP estimates that 70 percent of the poor are children and that in 1997 around 4000 
children were living on the streets, 60 percent of them in Ulaanbaatar.108 Overall, due to 
upheavals brought about by privatization during the democratic transition in Mongolia, 
industries and social conditions declined leading to a rapid increase in poverty. 
In 1997, the preparations for a May presidential election occupied the first part 
of the year. The former chair of the Small Great Hural, MPRP candidate N. Bagabandi, 
won easily with 60.8 percent of the vote over former President P. Ochirbat (29.8 
percent). There was an 85 percent voter turnout. The new power balance between the 
president from the MPRP on one side and democratic forces on the other side reflected 
the consolidation of the constitutional system and democratic process. For example, 
peaceful coexistence between parliament and president confirmed the consolidating 
democracy. 
Since 1996, Mongolian governments have been less stable, and a number of 
Prime Ministers have had to resign as a result of splits in the opposition party. Coalition 
governments resulted in four prime ministers in four years. The instability of the 
coalition led to political in-fighting, another corruption scandal, and a tendency among 
members of parliament to put personal political ambition above the interests of the 
coalition or nation. The coalitions four years in power were highly unstable and 
unpredictable. For example, in April 1998, the Coalition turned against its own Prime 
Minister, M. Ekhsaikhan. Tsakhia Elbegdorj109, the leader of the Mongolian National 
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Democratic Party (MNDP), which was the largest party in the governing Democratic 
Union (DU) coalition, who became prime minister in April 1998 for five months.  
In June, after Ts. Elbegdorjs resignation, President N. Bagabandi vetoed several 
candidates for Prime Minister: three nominees were vetoed a total of eleven times. 
Coalition leader, Davaagin Ganbold,110 one of the founders of the democracy movement, 
was rejected seven times.111 These actions made Mongolian democracy unstable. The 
instability shows that democratization was not a smooth process. Mongolia faced many 
complications that caused tense political conflicts and controversies. Another incident 
also shows that the transition in Mongolia was not smooth.  
On October 2, 1998 S. Zorig, one of the founding fathers of the democracy 
movement in Mongolia, was assassinated in the night just before his name was to be 
submitted to President N. Bagabandi as the next Prime Minister.112 His death shocked 
the Mongolian people. They feared that this incident would further lead to political 
instability and spoil the democratic reputation of Mongolia in the international 
community. 
S. Zorig was a strong advocate for non-violence, and had devoted eight years of 
his life to the political activist movement. Shortly after his murder, his sister, S. Oyun in 
October 1998 established an NGO named after her brother to continue his work. This 
NGO is a good example of an organization that has helped further democracy.  In 
                                                                                                                                           
from Harvard University with a Masters degree and in 2004 became Prime Minister, in a coalition with 
the MPRP.  
110 The first Deputy Prime Minister Davaadorjin Ganbold, a 35-year-old former university lecturer who 
helped lead the demonstrations which toppled the communist government. 
111 International Republican Institute. Mongolia Parliament Election Observation Mission Report. 
Washington D.C: IRI, July, 2000, 13. 
112 S. Zorig, a 36 year old Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) member, Member of Parliament 
and Minister of Infrastructure. He was brutally stabbed to death in his apartment[0]. Authorities have never 
identified any suspects. 
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countries where civil society is developing, NGOs have played an important role. The 
Zorig Foundation works to advance the formation of democratic society by spreading 
the ideas of democracy and human rights and fighting for political reform in Mongolia 
to make government more transparent and accountable.  Later, in December of the same 
year, S. Oyun,113 was elected as MP during a by-election in S. Zorigs constituency. 
Since 1998 she was re-elected three times to parliament and in August of 2004, she had 
a short-term appointment as a vice-speaker of the State Great Hural.  
Also, in December of 1998, Janlav Narantsatsralt became Prime Minister.114 He 
continued free market reforms and accelerated state enterprise privatization. His 
government did not last long. He and his cabinet were toppled due to a letter he had 
written to the Russian government involving its share of the Erdenet Copper Mine. The 
decision to remove J. Narantsatsralt was made by a secret vote. His removal was based 
on personal political interest rather than government policy.  It was because the coalition 
was in bad shape that everyone turned against each other and looked to simple mistakes 
to remove one another. Events such as these were setbacks on the road to democracy.  
In July 1999, the coalitions fourth Prime Minister, Rinchinnyam Amarjargal, 
took over the cabinet when J. Narantsatsralt was forced to leave. 115 His government 
policies were focused on economic and judicial reform, privatization, and the 
                                                
113 S. Oyun graduated from the Karlova University in Czechoslovakia in 1987 and afterwards she pursued 
PhD in Earth Sciences (geochemistry) from the University of Cambridge. She is also the Chair of the 
Citizens Will Party[0]. 
114 J. Narantsastralt , only 41 years old and former mayor of Ulaanbaatar, was a member of the MNDP and 
a Prime   Minister. He graduated from the Land Management Institute of Moscow in 1981 as a land 
manager-engineer with a PhD in Geography. Later he received his second degree from Lomonosov 
University of Moscow in 1987 as a political scientist. He is in parliament as MP since 1996. In 2004 he 
was re-elected to the parliament. 
115  R. Amargargal graduated from the Economics Institute, Moscow, Russia in 1982 as an economist.       
R. Amarjargal was MP from the 1996 to 2000. He had been Minister of Foreign Affairs during                 
Ts. Elbegdorjs government[0]. In July of 2004 he was nominated as an independent candidate and re-
elected as an MP. 
 43
development of solar energy.  Because the government in Mongolia changed hands so 
frequently, numerous reforms were implemented within a short period and this caused a 
strain both on the economy and political stability in the country. However, these policies 
were a good supplement to the development of the economy. They created the first open 
environment for private business, which has led to a rapid economic expansion in the 
private sector. By 2000 about 70 percent of the economy was in private hands, Mongolia 
had achieved the implementation of major economic reform policies. However, the 
political situation did not lead to democratic consolidation because these sudden changes 
in the government led people to think the coalition was ineffective, inexperienced and 
unstable in governing. 
Thus, in the 2000 election, the pendulum of power swung back again to the 
MPRP. In this election, with a voter turnout of 82.43 percent, the MPRP obtained 72 of 
76 seats (95 percent) in Parliament. A single party government was formed. The 42-
year-old chairman of the MPRP, Nambarin Enkhbayar, was appointed as Prime 
Minister.116 In an act of public re-assurance, the new Prime Minister stated,[w]e are not 
some monsters who have come to power, but people who speak the same language as 
the democrats.117  The reason for the failure of the Democratic Coalition in the election 
was clear:118 the Coalition had collapsed and each party ran its own slate of candidates. 
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Nevertheless, they learned from their defeat and joined forces in December 2000 when 
the five opposition parties, including the MSDP and MNDP, merged to form the 
Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP). In many constituencies candidates won a narrow 
victory.  
These election results showed that the Mongolian people put considerable trust 
and confidence in the MPRP.  The government followed a liberal economic reform 
agenda. Parliament approved the new governments Action Program to double the 
salaries of civil servants, and seniors pensions, and cut the tax on businesses. This led to 
a budget deficit, thus, destabilizing the economy. The Action Program was mainly 
focused on the privatization of large state enterprises such as the national airline MIAT, 
the NIC Oil Company, Gobi Cashmere, the Erdenet copper facility and the Trade 
Development Bank. Almost all of the former State enterprises had now been privatized.  
Furthermore, The State Great Hural of Mongolia decided it was a time to draft a 
land privatization law. The Private Land Act, implemented in May of 2003, stipulates 
that every Mongolian citizen has the right to receive a certain amount of land free of 
charge. However, many influential people including some in government became large 
landholders. The Act benefited the country, but ironically enabled these elites to become 
wealthier.  
On the other hand, during the MPRP government a number of events took place 
that also set back democracy. For example, from 1992 to 1996 the MPRPs government-
owned national radio and television stations provided a great challenge for the 
opposition because the media had become even more difficult for the minority to access. 
                                                                                                                                           
The MPRP gathered only slightly more than 50 percent of the popular vote. Many think the election law 
needs to be reformed so that the number of seats held by different parties in the parliament more closely 
reflects the popular vote.  
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Furthermore, the MPRPs newly established government replaced many civil servants 
because of their political affiliation.  
Natural disasters increased the problems the country faced while trying to 
stabilize its economy and political environment.  The extremely harsh winter of 1999-
2000 caused the loss of 2.6 million head of livestock.  According to the official statistics, 
this affected thousands of herders, whose livelihood depended on their animals. The 
following year, in 2000-2001, another harsh winter caused the death of 3.4 million more 
head of livestock.  Prime Minister N. Enkhbayar did not deal effectively with this 
natural disaster. He simply stated that Mongolians should stop being nomads and that it 
was necessary to urbanize 90 percent of Mongolia.119 But after centuries of a nomadic 
lifestyle, people found it impossible to comply with such a decision. Fortunately, the 
Mongolian government had received some assistance from the international donor 
countries for the supply of food and goods for nomads that suffered during these harsh 
winter conditions. 
Although the winters had been cold, Vladimir Putins visit in 2000 warmed the 
relationship between Mongolia and Russia. Because of the domestic concerns in each 
country, relations between the two had suffered over the previous 10 years. Vladimir 
Putin was the first Russian President to have visited Mongolia since Brezhnevs visit in 
1974. His visit helped to improve the relationship between Mongolia and the Russian 
Federation. In December 2003, the Russian government cancelled Mongolias debts 
accumulated during the Soviet era. The negotiations started after the visit to Russia in 
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July by Prime Minister N. Enkhbayar.120 As a result, today Mongolia is on friendly 
terms with the Russian Federation. 
The most significant event of 2001 was the May presidential election. The MPRP 
incumbent, President N. Bagabandi, won the presidential election (See Chapter 3 for 
more detailed results of this election), and the elections further enhanced the MPRPs 
dominance at the parliamentary and presidential levels. The Democratic Party had found 
it difficult to rebuild public confidence after their tumultuous years in power. The 
Democratic Partys lack of experience led to the MPRPs ability to capitalize on their 
own governing abilities to handle the political and economic crises more effectively.  
Not too long after this election the terrorist attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001 occurred. This event had an effect on cashmere prices and, 
therefore, Mongolias economy and politics. The Mongolian economy, heavily 
dependent on export of cashmere, experienced a decline when the products price 
dropped. The political environment changed as well when N. Enkhbayars government 
agreed with the Bush administration to take part in peacekeeping operations in Iraq. The 
Mongolian army was also sent to peaceful zones in Afghanistan to demonstrate 
Mongolias support for the operations. Mongolia was later selected by the United States 
as one of the countries to participate in the Millennium Challenge Account in 2002.121 
The possibility of being selected in the Millennium Challenge Account project was very 
important for Mongolian economic freedom. This achievement, combined with the fact 
                                                
120 The Mongolian Press reported that a debt of $11.4 billion to Russia would be written off by 90 percent 
and the rest would be paid through scheduled payment[0]s.  See Unuudur, December, 2003 
121 The U.S assistance program announced by President Bush in 2002[0]. According to the CRS Report for 
Congress, the Millennium Challenge Account was a new supplemental foreign-aid program focused on 
economic growth in poor countries, good governance and economic freedom. The Mongolian government 
looked forward to working with Congress. See CRS Report for Congress, Millennium Challenge 
Account: Implementation of a New U.S. Foreign Aid Initiative, Larry Nowels, Specialist in Foreign 
Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division (February 7, 2006). 
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that Russia had cancelled Mongolias massive debt, gave the incumbent government 
great hope for electoral success in the coming parliamentary election because funding 
from Congress was around $1 billion. 
Mongolians looked forward to the election of 2004 with patience and curiosity to 
discover whether the political pendulum would swing back again to the democratic 
forces or stay with the MPRP.  It was difficult to predict what would happen. 
Surprisingly, in the June 2004 parliamentary election, the MPRP and the Democrat 
parties split the vote 50:50 getting equal representation in parliament.122 Mongolian 
voters' attitude toward a party can change radically as this pendulum had already swung 
back during the previous 1996 election. However, the 2004 election demonstrated a 
surprising degree of unpredictability in Mongolian politics. Indeed, equal representation 
in parliament provided a positive democratic exercise for both parties because they had 
to make compromises to form a government. The election results demonstrate that the 
democratic challenges and opportunities presented to the Mongolian government 
allowed them to consolidate democracy. Because of these democratic achievements, the 
MPRP expected a large amount of public support.  
During this period many dramatic changes took place that contributed to 
Mongolias transition to democracy; namely the growth of civil society and numerous 
economic and institutional reforms. When compared to countries that fall into the grey 
zone between authoritarianism and democracy, Mongolia has been exceptional. Its 
                                                
122 It was agreed that the two major parties  the MPRP and the MDC - would each hold the posts of 
Speaker of Parliament and Prime Minister for two years in rotation. The replaced Prime Minister would be 
able to hold the post of the Deputy Premier for another term. The term of all other ministers, except for the 
Prime Minister and Deputy Premier, would be four years. Political parties were to nominate and appoint 
people to their allocated posts as defined by the bargaining process[0].  
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transition to democracy occurred without floundering in the dangerous grey zone that 
Carothers speaks of.  Overall the Mongolian economic and political situation gradually 
improved under stable governments. 
 
Conclusion 
The transformation from an authoritarian system to a democracy is a lengthy and 
controversial process. The difficult transition from a centrally planned economy to a free 
market economy has been undertaken by many nations and its impact has been varied; 
however, there are a number of common features that characterize this process.  
Transitioning countries implement economic policies based on the particular experience 
of their transition period. Factors such as the historical background, economic 
endowment and the shock of transition vary from nation to nation.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, Mongolia began the move 
towards democracy. But external actions alone can neither create nor destroy 
democracy. In this chapter, the case of Mongolian democratic transition demonstrates 
that the Soviet Unions collapse was an external factor that influenced the move towards 
democracy. Mongolian transition to democracy was strengthened by leaders and 
younger generations of Mongolians that were considering the possibilities of breaking 
away from Soviet control in the early 1980s. The Mongolian experience confirms the 
importance of historical preconditions and suggests that Mongolias transition to 
democracy would have been different had it not been for the Soviet influences. This 
parallels the fourth assumption of the transition paradigm that social and economic 
factors affect the transition to democracy. 
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The transition periods first four years was a time of economic crisis in 
Mongolia, but since 1994, positive economic growth has been sustained. The major 
growth sectors have been agriculture, industry, mining, and construction. Even though 
the 1996 and 2000 elections resulted in different parties gaining power because the 
pendulum swung back in 2000, the ruling parties successfully implemented their 
government programs. Mongolia has had multiple changes of government in quick 
succession that contributed to democratic consolidation. 
 Assumption two of the transition paradigm states that there is a sequential 
process of stages that countries will follow while shifting to democracy.  Mongolia is a 
case study that conforms to these stages. For example, the first stage, political opening, 
occurred in Mongolia in the late 1980s when the dictatorial regime began to break down 
and space was created for democracy promoters.  
Following the demise of Soviet-type regimes most countries of post communist 
Inner Asia either experienced initial political openings followed by reversion to 
authoritarianism or moved directly from one type of harsh authoritarianism to 
another. Mongolia is exceptional. The extent of political opening there during the 
1990s far exceeded anything seen in any neighboring country and the gains of 
the early post-Soviet period were maintained instead of reversed.123 
 
The second stage, political breakthrough, occurred throughout the 1990s when 
democratic structures were put in place to ensure freedom of democracy. The third stage, 
consolidation, has occurred in Mongolia through the numerous reforms that continue to 
allow the development of democracy. This indicates that Mongolia maintained a 
successful political opening that led to gradual democratic consolidation.  
                                                
123 Steven Fish, M. The Inner Asian anomaly: Mongolia's democratization in comparative 
perspective. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34: 3 (September 2001): 323. 
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The next chapter will examine the Mongolian electoral system and analyze the 
democratic elections held since 1990.  
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CHAPTER III 
 THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
 
Introduction   
Election and electoral systems are essential elements of a democracy. Countries 
moving towards democracy face major challenges in choosing the right electoral system 
to fit their countrys historical and social circumstances and to ensure fair and 
competitive elections. Guillermo ODonnell states that fair elections are the main 
criterion that certifies countries as democratic before other governments and 
international opinion.124  The importance of electoral laws cannot be understated 
because they help to ensure that the electoral system is not corrupt. Hence, an 
examination of electoral system and electoral law is essential to determine whether a 
country is a democracy.  
Mongolia, a post-communist country, is a newly established and successful 
democracy. One of the key elements of this success is Mongolias parliamentary 
governance which has contributed to the development of a fair and transparent electoral 
system.  This chapter will examine Carothers critiques of the third assumption 
regarding the importance of elections, and the fifth assumption which argues that many 
                                                
124 O'Donnell, Illusions about Consolidation.  Journal of Democracy VII: 2 (April 1996), 44. 
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transitioning countries face state-building problems. This chapter will assess the quality 
of Mongolian democracy-building and the electoral system to determine whether the 
country parallels the transition paradigm outlined by ODonnell and Schmitter or the 
critiques suggested Carothers. An answer to two questions will be provided in this 
chapter: (1) Were there flaws during Mongolias election process as Carothers predicts? 
and (2), did Mongolias democracy promoters effectively pay attention to state-building 
concerns while building a democratic system?  These questions will be answered by 
providing a review and interpretation of the essential elements of the election process 
and the results of each democratic election held in Mongolia since it began its transition 
to democracy in 1990. This chapter is divided into three sections dealing respectively 
with the electoral system, election law, and elections in Mongolia.  
 
The Electoral System 
Democratic elections should translate votes into power fairly. There is a wide 
variety of election systems used around the world and a given election system will not 
operate in the same way in all countries. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) describes electoral systems as means to translate votes into party 
representation and allocate seats in the parliament or the legislature.125 According to the 
IDEA, for electoral system design the key variables are the electoral formula used, 
whether the system is majoritarian or proportional, and what mathematical formula is 
used to calculate the seat allocation and the size of constituencies, as well as the number 
of parliamentarians a district elects.126 The IDEA outlines three broad families of 
                                                
125 International IDEA, Handbook of Electoral System Design (Stockholm, Sweden: 1997), 7. 
126 Ibid. 
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electoral systems. Among these systems, First Past The Post (FPTP) and Proportional 
Representation (PR) systems are the most popular.  
 It is important to review the FPTP and the PR systems to understand the 
efficiency of an electoral system and how to design the best system that works for the 
countrys specific socio-political context. According to the IDEA analysis, one third of 
the worlds countries use the List Proportional Representation system.  The PR system 
promotes multi-party participation in elections and gives opportunities for minority party 
representation. The purpose of the PR systems is to consciously translate a partys 
share of the national votes into a corresponding proportion of parliamentary seats. While 
seats are often allocated within regionally-based multi-member districts, the 
parliamentary seat distribution is effectively determined by the overall national vote.127  
Many developing countries choose First Past the Post128 for the formation of a 
stable government. 
In the FPTP the winner is the candidate with the most votes, but not necessarily 
an absolute majority of the votes. Sixty eight countries, just under one third of 
the worlds countries that hold elections, use the FPTP systems. It is thought that 
the FPTP system promotes a party system with relatively few parties (sometimes 
only two).129 
 
The FPTP system is also very clear and simple to use. Basically it provides a choice 
between different political parties and their candidates. It is a suitable system for newly 
democratic country without strong political institutions that have two political parties, 
                                                
127 Ibid., 60. 
128 The FPTP system is also known as a single-member plurality system[0]. 
129 IDEA, 18-28. 
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because it produces a majority government.130 However, it should be noted that this is 
not always the case in multi-party systems.  
Elections and democracy are two sides of the same coin: The choice of 
electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any 
democracy.131 Thus we need to analyze the electoral system in terms of electoral 
constituencies, the number of seats, and the method of election, and we also need to 
delve into the actual electoral campaigns by analyzing party platforms and campaign 
results.  
Mongolia has carefully designed its own election system to suit its unique 
historical and socio-political conditions. The transitioning country chose a semi-
presidential institutional design in which there is sharing of power between presidential 
and parliamentary governance. Mongolia now has a modified version of the FTPT 
system for the parliamentary elections. The Prime Minister is head of the government. 
The Prime Minister appoints his cabinet subject to the approval of the State Great Hural. 
For the presidential elections Mongolia has used the Two-Round System.  The President 
is the symbolic executive of the state, elected for four-year terms. However, various 
parliamentary elections have been contested under different electoral rules including a 
block vote system (1992), a party list and candidate list system (1996), and a first-past-
the-post system (2000).132  
                                                
130 The IDEA explains that when the FPTP system is used in multi-member districts, it is referred to as 
the Block Vote in which voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled. The highest-polling 
candidates fill the positions, regardless of the percentage of the vote they actually achieve.  
See IDEA,18. 
131 Ibid., 1. 
132 Todd Landman, Marco Larizza,  Claire McEvoy, State Of Democracy In Mongolia A Desk Study , 
Human Rights Centre (University of Essex, United Kingdom, 2005), 42. 
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Two-Round Systems are a common method for electing presidents. The French 
Two-Round System tries to ensure that the winning candidate receives an absolute 
majority of the vote cast, that is, over fifty percent.133  According to IDEAs 
explanation: 
The first round is conducted in the same way as a FPTP election. If a candidate 
receives an absolute majority of the vote, then they are elected right away, with 
no need for a second ballot. If, no candidate receives an absolute majority, then a 
second round of voting is conducted, and the winner of this round, if s/he 
receives a majority, is declared elected.134 
 
Simply put it is called the two round system because, if no candidate receives a majority 
in the first round, a second round vote is held in which the two top candidates compete 
with one candidate declared the winner.  
 
Mongolias Electoral Law 
 Elections laws help establish electoral systems which establish regular and 
democratic elections. The new Constitution of Mongolia guarantees citizens the 
universal right to vote if they are age 18 and over. Mongolian elections are currently 
governed by three separate laws, with a substantial amount of repetition and overlap of 
articles and provisions. The election laws are ambiguous to some extent; the terms used 
in the election laws have neither been clearly defined nor clearly interpreted. Following 
the establishment of the Constitution, the first Parliamentary Election Law was adopted 
in 1992. Provincial government election law and the presidential election law were 
approved in 1993 by the State Great Hural. The Parliamentary Election Law specifies 
that 76 members shall be elected to the State Great Hural of Mongolia through the use of 
                                                
133 Ibid., 18. 
134 Ibid., 43. 
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a multi-member district majoritarian system, but the electoral law was amended in 1996 
and initiated a single-member district system. The last two elections for parliament 
(2000 and 2004) were held according to this amended electoral law. In the last 
parliamentary election in 2004, some election irregularities and fraud appeared and as a 
result the coalition government formed by the two major parties rewrote the 
Parliamentary Election Law in December of 2005. In order to prevent the type of 
election fraud that occurred in the 2004 parliamentary election, the coalition government 
instituted electoral reform. The 2005 reform introduced a new mixed majority and 
proportional representation system in which 76 members are elected from multi-member 
districts. This multi-member district system ranges from nineteen electoral districts with 
four mandates each, to thirty-eight districts with two mandates.135 Prior to the election 
the General Election Committee will determine which system to use for a particular 
election. 
 In order to monitor parties finances and determine whether parties are corrupt or 
not, the General Election Committee audits parties, coalitions and independent 
candidates campaign accounts during and after an elections and makes sure this 
information is available to the public. Campaign finances are monitored to deter political 
parties from passing legislations that will benefit or reward party donors.136  The Law on 
Political Parties defines that political parties party property and income should come 
from membership fees, donations, entrepreneurial activities by the party, and party fund-
                                                
135 The parliamentary election law stipulates that candidates should be at least 25 years old to be elected 
member of the State Great Hural and independent candidates should receive the support from a minimum 
of 801 eligible voters to be nominated. Many reforms have been made to election laws that include 
regulating campaign expenses. See The State Great Hural Election Law, Article 7.2, December 2005, 
General Election Commission (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia), 2. 
136 D. Burmaa, The Political Party and Election Campaign Financing Assessment Study Mongolia, 
(Ulaanbaatar, 2003), 1. 
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raising activities. Donations, from individuals and business, are the main source of 
funding for political parties in Mongolia and increase during the pre-election campaigns.  
Recently, it has become customary for politicians to receive donations from the 
business sector:  
usage of state resources for political campaigns constitutes a misuse of public 
authority for the benefit of individual or group interests (corruption) that has the 
added negative impact of consolidating single-party domination. The domination 
of a single party (and its counterpart, the weakness of opposition parties) in 
Mongolia, along with a Parliamentary political structure that gives significant 
executive power to the dominant party in the legislature, constitutes a major 
roadblock to reform of the conditions that foster corruption.137 
 
For example, some political parties such as the Mongolian Republican Party and the 
Motherland-New Democratic Socialist Party of Mongolia are each entirely funded by a 
single business. 
In order to monitor elections Mongolias constitution calls for a General Election 
Commission. This Commission, appointed by the parliament, is a highly independent 
institution.138 The Election Commissions mandate includes organizing and monitoring 
all elections and referendums in Mongolia. Since its establishment it has organized and 
conducted five parliamentary elections and four presidential elections.139  Although the 
parliament and president appoint Commission members there have been instances when 
more than 70 percent of the Commission members have belonged to a single political 
                                                
137 U.S Agency for International Development, USAID, Assessment of Corruption in Mongolia Final 
Report, August, 2005, 16. 
138 Before the 2006 revision of the General Election Commission Law, the Commission consisted of 
eleven appointed members. After 2006, it was reduced to nine. 
139 The Parliament appoints the Commissions Chairman and the Secretary.  The President of Mongolia 
together with the Supreme Court appoints the remaining nine members of the Election Commission to six 
year terms.  See General Election Commission Law, The State Great Hural, 2006, General Election 
Commissions English translation version (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia), 1-8. 
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party.140  For example, during the 1996 elections, eight members of the Election 
Commission were MPRP members. This occurs because the Election Commission 
appointments are primarily given to members and supporters of the party that dominates 
the incumbent parliament. Also opposition complaints were raised in many places about 
the inclusion of MPRP members on electoral sub-district as non-partisans.141 The 
Commission has the right to inspect finances, monitor the financial flows of campaign 
funds, and audit if necessary.  
During the period of the elections, district and regional commissions as well as 
their branches and sub-commissions are established. Monitoring has been conducted 
based on relevant articles and provisions of the Parliamentary Election Law, Anti-
Corruption Laws, and the Laws on Public Services and Political Parties. All these 
overlapping laws prohibit the abuse of state resources and media resources during 
election campaigns, especially the use of human and material assets, including property, 
equipment and funds that belong to government institutions. For instance, Article 41 of 
the Parliamentary Election Law, in particular, prohibits candidates from receiving, 
during the election campaigns, donations from governmental organizations or private 
enterprises that own state properties.142  However, these provisions are frequently not 
enforced. 
Personnel are often blatantly fired without consideration for civil service hiring 
and removal practices. They are then replaced by staff chosen on the basis of 
political patronage, including those who worked or contributed to the campaigns, 
                                                
140 The chairman and all seven secretaries have been members of the MPRP since the establishment of the 
Commission. Ten out of fifteen members of the Commission appointed since 1992 were MPRP members 
and five were non-partisans. 
141 For more information see General Election Commission website: http://www.gec.gov.mn 
142 The State Great Hural Election Law, Article 7.2, December 2005, General Election Commission 
(Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia), 23. 
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regardless of whether or not they possess the capabilities or skills required by the 
jobs to which they are assigned.143  
 
If any violation has taken place before the General Election Commission, the Supreme 
Court is asked to deal with these more complex election complaints. Despite minor 
infractions, Mongolia has been moving along the path to becoming a successful 
democracy. 
 
Elections in Mongolia 
The First Congress of the MPRP, known as the Great Hural, held indirect 
elections. However, an amendment to the 1940 constitution introduced direct elections, 
whereby a secret ballot replaced raised hands for a list of candidates at open meetings. In 
1960, the Mongolian legislative body, or upper house, became the Peoples Great Hural 
with 370 deputies.144 The first of the democratic multi-party upper house proportional 
representation elections was held in July 1990. In 1990 reforms negotiated by the 
Democratic Party with the monopoly MPRP successfully introduced free elections and 
democratic state institutions into the new Constitution of Mongolia. Before 1990: 
[t]he provisional parliament consisted of two-chambers, with a 430 member 
directly elected lower house [The Peoples Great Hural] members, and fifty 
members indirectly elected members in the upper house [The State Little Hural]. 
The number of seats allocated to each party in the upper house had to be 
proportional to the number of seats held by the party in the lower house.145 
 
In the 1990 election for upper house members, the MPRP was allocated 31 seats, the 
Democratic Party was given 13 seats and the Social- Democrats and the National 
                                                
143 USAID, 12. 
144 Sanders, 507-510. 
145 Christian Schafferer, The 2004 Parliamentary Election In Mongolia: Big Surprises And Small 
Victories. East Asia, 3:2 (December 2004): 1. 
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Progress Party received 3 seats each out of total 50 seats.146 The newly constituted State 
Little Hural elected Punsalmaagin Ochirbat as President of Mongolia, D. Byambasuren 
as Prime Minister and Randaasumberlin Gonchigdorj, the leader of the Mongolian 
Social Democratic Party as Vice-President and Chairman of the State Little Hural. The 
State Little Hural and President P. Ochirbat established the Constitution Drafting 
Commission. In January 1992, a new Constitution was adopted ensuring human rights, 
and free and fair elections. The old two chamber parliament system changed to a one 
chamber parliament, and reduced the number of members from 430 to 76, elected for 
four year terms. The law stipulates that 76 member shall be elected by plurality vote in 
26 multi-member electoral districts each with either two or four mandates. 
Elections in 1992 and 2000 demonstrated the importance of forming a 
democratic coalition. To be a strong opposition to the MPRP (which had existed for 80 
years and had developed a plethora of grassroots structures, funding, members and 
experience), a coalition among the contesting parties was necessary. Also the contending 
parties were still relatively inexperienced, and unless they united into a coalition, they 
endangered splitting the opposition vote. This was the case in the 1992 and 2000 
elections when, despite the fact that they received more than 45 percent popular vote, 
they ended with only four to six seats in parliament per contending party. In order to 
beat the MPRP, parties had to form a coalition before the election, but the coalitions 
were loose and based on the "front" against the former communists and not on a 
particular ideology. This explains why the democratic parties easily split after the 
elections.147  
                                                
146 Sanders, 518. 
147 Since 1990, a total of nine parties merged together inside the united Democratic Party[0]. 
 61
Since the 1990s, Mongolia has held four parliamentary elections in 1992, 1996, 
2000 and 2004, and four presidential elections in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2005. Democrats 
have once won the presidential election in 1993, and the MPRP has won the other three.  
Presidential elections are held a year after the parliamentary elections. The MPRP won a 
majority in the 1992 and 2000 parliamentary elections, while the Democratic Coalition 
won in the 1996 parliamentary elections and formed a coalition government in the 2004 
parliamentary elections.  
 
The 1992 and 1993 Elections  
On June 28, 1992, in the first parliamentary elections of the transition period, 76 
members ran in twenty-six multi-member districts in accordance with the new 
Constitution and the State Great Hural Election Law that was adopted in April 1992. 
Mongolia has 18 provinces that form constituencies, three big cities, Darkhan and 
Erdenet, which form one constituency each, and the capital Ulaanbaatar city, which 
comprises six constituencies. Successful candidates were chosen on the plurality basis.  
Before the election, the Political Party law was approved by the parliament so 
that contesting parties officially registered by April 1992 could run in the election. Two 
coalitions and eight parties were registered to run in the first multi-party election. The 
first coalition, the Democratic Alliance, consisted of the Mongolian Democratic Party, 
the Mongolian Democratic National Progress Party and the Mongolian United Party. 
The second coalition was comprised of the Mongolian Democratic Believers Party and 
the Mongolian Peoples Party.148 The remaining eight parties ran independently.149 In 
                                                
148 Schafferer, 2. 
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the elections of 1992, 275 out of 293 candidates were from 10 parties/coalitions and the 
other 18 were independent candidates.150 The MPRP won 70 of the 76 seats in the State 
Great Hural, though it received only 56 percent of the popular vote. (See Appendix III, 
Table 1) The Democratic Alliance got four seats and the MSDP one seat, and one 
independent candidate was elected. The one independent and the opposition parties four 
MPs belonged to the group of the first ten democrats who formed the democratic 
movements in Mongolia. They were: S. Zorig, Ts. Elbegdorj, R. Gonchigdorj, A. 
Ganbaatar and  
D. Ganbold. The opposition vote was split among a broad number of parties and 
coalitions. According to the IDEA,  
in Mongolia in 1992 the Block Vote system allowed the ruling Mongolian 
Peoples Revolutionary Party to win 92% of the seats with only 57% of the 
votes. This was considered by many to be not merely unfair but dangerous to 
democracy, and the electoral system was consequently changed for the elections 
of 1996.151  
 
The IDEA and Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE) define a Block Vote as simply the 
use of plurality voting in multi-member districts. Voters have as many votes as there are 
seats to be filled in their district, and are usually free to vote for individual candidates 
regardless of party affiliation.152  
The Block Vote system worsened the chances for the opposition and this system 
was used only once. The MPRP received approximately 60 percent of the vote from the 
twenty country constituencies. Most candidates were MPRP leaders and well-known 
party members. Local Communist leaders in the countryside were more widely 
                                                                                                                                           
149 These eight parties included: the MSDP, the MPRP, The Religious Democratic Party, the United 
Herdsmen and Farmers Party, the United Private Owners Party, the Mongolian Party of Independence, the 
Green Party and the Mongolian Capitalists Party. 
150 J. Yadamsuren, Democratic Election Data, Election Commission Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2002. 
151 IDEA, 11-12. 
152 Ibid. 
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recognized and popular, and people in rural areas were all MPRP members. A new 
government with a new policy towards economic reform was formed under P. Jasrai of 
the MPRP. 
 One party had dominated Mongolian politics and the entire country for seventy 
years. This dominance was one of the reasons why the Democrats were defeated. They 
found it difficult to establish contact with a highly dispersed rural population. These 
difficulties included the underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, and the lack of 
media and information available to rural Mongolians. This particular election was 
assessed as free and fair and democratic forces took some seats in the parliament which 
helped enhance democratic reform.   
On June 6, 1993 Mongolia had its first free multi-party presidential election. (See 
Appendix II Table 1). Only parties holding seats in the State Great Hural were allowed 
to nominate presidential candidates, who then participated in the two-round presidential 
election. Although, voters did not have a substantial knowledge of presidential power or 
the President Election Law, voters turnout was high at 92.7 percent.153  
The former President, P. Ochirbat, was rejected as the MPRP candidate and he 
joined the Mongolian National Democratic Party. So the Democratic Alliance accepted 
him as their candidate for the Presidential election. P. Ochirbat was re-elected for a 
second term as president with 58 percent of the votes. His competitor, L. Tudev154 
received 38 percent of the vote.155 (See Appendix II, Table 1). For P. Ochirbat the loss 
of his MPRP party membership provided him with a good opportunity which allowed 
                                                
153 Yadamsuren, 104. 
154 L. Tudev was the editor of the MPRP party newspaper Unen or Truth which was the Mongolian 
newspaper equivalent of the Russian Pravda. 
155 Ginsburg, 468. 
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him the chance to be re-elected in cooperation with democratic forces. P. Ochirbats 
charismatic personality equipped him well to serve as president and he managed to 
strengthen his reputation during his presidency. There were several reasons why he was 
able to receive voters support and improve his reputation, including the fact that people 
thought it would be a bad idea to change the president frequently during the transition to 
democracy.156 Rather than basing their vote on personal characteristics, L. Tudevs 
supporters believed that he would consider the countrys best interests while in power.157  
 The first presidential election proved that democracy in Mongolia had been 
strengthened and gave citizens the opportunity for meaningful choice. The majority of 
the population from the big cities, as well as Central, Gobi and Eastern provinces, 
supported the democratic party member P. Ochirbat, while the Western provinces voted 
for the communist MPRP member L. Tudev. P, Ochirbat won 14 of 18 provinces.158 The 
first presidential election played a significant role in establishing a balance between the 
presidency and the parliament. The outcome of this election saw the communist party 
come into executive power and the democrats gain control of the parliament. Thus this 
presidential election led to a balance between the two major political forces and that 
strengthened the democratic transition.   
 
The 1996 Election 
The democratic transition period continued and in 1996 the parliamentary 
election was conducted by FPTP in single-member districts. Article 26 of the Election 
                                                
156 Gunfsambuu Khayanhyarva, Social Stratification In Contemporary Mongolian Society  Zotol Club of 
Professional Sociologist (Ulaanbaatar 2002),115. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ginsburg, 469. 
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Law, revised in January 1996, divided Mongolia into 76 single member districts with 
one candidate chosen from each constituency.  In the elections of 1996, 267 out of 302 
candidates were from 7 parties/coalitions and there were 35 independents.159 The 
Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) and the Mongolian Social Democratic 
Party (MSDP) formed a coalition called the Democratic Union Coalition (DUC). This 
party defeated the former communist party, the MPRP, winning an overwhelming 
victory.  
The coalition used the 1994 Contract with America160 as a model for the 
Contract with the Mongolian Voters.  The Contract was the most widely 
disseminated document in Mongolian history, with numerous promises for 
sweeping political, economic, and social reform. 161  
 
Although its election platforms promises sounded unrealistic, for the first time in 
Mongolian history democrats won a parliamentary election and the DUC gained 50 of 
the 76 seats. The MPRP lost it hold on power for the first time in seventy-five years and 
received just 25 seats in the State Great Hural. The voter turnout was 92 percent (See 
Appendix III, V Table 2).  
The new Hural, with an average age of 38, reflected the youth of the country. 
Seven of the new MPs were women, up from three in previous Hural but down 
from the 20% mandated in the one-party period. Seventeen of the new MPs were 
in private business or were leaders of NGOs, reflecting the rise of civil society as 
an important political force.162  
 
Most elected parliamentarians were well known DUC party members who had actively 
taken part in the pro-democracy movement. The 25 elected MPs from the MPRP were 
former MPs in the 1992-1996 parliaments.  
                                                
159 Yadamsuren. 
160 In comparison with the Republican platform in the United States, the 1992 Mongolian elections were 
presented as a right-wing platform.  
161 International Republican Institute. Mongolia Parliament Election Observation Mission Report. 
(Washington D.C: IRI, July, 2000), 10. 
162 Ginsburg, Mongolia in 1996: Fighting Fire and Ice. Asian Survey 37: 1 (January 1997), 61. 
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However, this election victory brought various challenges and difficulties for the 
democrats because experienced MPRP bureaucrats and well qualified professionals were 
replaced with the younger and less-experienced DUC party members. Former MP and 
economist, Mendsaikhan Enksaikhan, head of the DUC, was elected as the new Prime 
Minister. The new government introduced judicial reforms and radical economic 
reforms, freed the media, and strengthened the legal system. Fortunately, the transition 
from the incumbent to the Democratic Union proved to be peaceful and smooth, an 
important step toward democratic consolidation, because the communist party was voted 
out of power and the opposition democrats were voted in. Thus democracy was further 
consolidated and strengthened in Mongolia. 
Mongolias democratic transition period continued into the second presidential 
election in 1997. Three candidates were nominated from the parties holding seats in 
parliament. N. Bagabandi, the former speaker of the State Great Hural, was nominated 
by the MPRP; P. Ochirbat, was nominated by the Democratic Alliance; and Jambin 
Gombojav was nominated by the Mongolian United Conservative Party. On May 19, 
1997 N. Bagabandi, the candidate for the MPRP, won the second presidential election 
(See Appendix II Table 1).163  He was supported by 60.8 percent of the electorate on a 
platform that proposed to slow down the rapid political and economic reforms 
undertaken by the previous government. Incumbent President P. Ochirbat of the 
Democratic Union split the remaining vote by 29.6 percent with J. Gombojav who 
                                                
163 MPRP President N. Bagabandi used his power of veto to reject several candidates nominated for prime 
minister by the Democratic Coalition. Meanwhile, the Coalition was blamed for this unstable situation and 
for dismissing four prime ministers and cabinets within four years. 
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received 7.7 percent of the vote.164 Once again, there was a high turnout of 85 percent of 
the 1.1 million eligible voters.  
N.  Bagabandi had strong financial and media support from the MPRP.165 
Competitor J. Gombojav had extensive experience working in the rural areas, so he 
received votes from herders. On the other hand, incumbent president P. Ochirbat relied 
on his personal charisma and a platform that focused on economic reforms such as tax-
free imports; this proved very attractive to voters.166 Yet, P. Ochirbat was not sure 
whether he would receive the same support that he had gathered during his first 
presidential victory. The Democrats, however, could not find any other reputable 
candidate who could meet the age requirement of 45 years under the presidential 
election law. 
This election result also proved that the voters preference could shift 
dramatically from one political party to another. Voters considered the candidates 
official position, party affiliation and past political performance. This is a strong 
indication that Mongolian voters are prepared to see regime change and indicates that 
the ongoing new elections are genuinely democratic and that the transition to democracy 
continued successfully.   
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The Parliamentary Election of 2000 and the 2001 Presidential Election 
On July 2, 2000, the third parliamentary election returned political power to the 
MPRP.167  Twenty of Mongolias 24 political parties participated in the election, either 
independently or in a coalition (See Appendix III, V Table 3). The three parliamentary 
parties  the MPRP, the MNDP and the MSDP - all ran 76 candidates. Critically, the 
Democratic Union Coalition broke apart and the MSDP decided to compete in the 
election on its own. MPRP candidates ran under their party symbol, rather than as 
individuals. Voters chose between parties, rather than between candidates. The three 
ranking members of the MNDP parliamentary fraction formed the Mongolian 
Democratic Party. In March 2000, S. Zorigs sister, S. Oyun, formed the Citizens Will 
Party.168 Soon after, the Democratic Union Coalition and the Green Party formed a 
coalition with the Citizens Will Party. Only the MNDP and the small Mongolian 
Religious Democratic Party remained in the Democratic Union Coalition. Fifteen 
political parties and coalitions took part in the 2000 elections.169  
 The election resulted in a massive victory for the MPRP, with 72 out of the 76 
seats, though it received only 50.3 percent of the vote, and despite the fact that the 
democratic force received 46 percent of the vote of the electorate.170 The MPRP had 
nominated eight women candidates who were all elected as members of the parliament. 
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One member of the MNDP, former Prime Minister J. Narantsastralt, was one of only 
four non-MPRP MPs elected. Another was S. Oyun, head of The Citizens Will / The 
Green Party Coalition, re-elected from her constituency in Dornod province. The third 
was       B. Erdenebat, chairman of Mongolian New Socialist Democratic Party, who 
won election in Ulaanbaatar. A single independent, L. Gundalai, won with 41.57 percent 
of the vote in Khuvsgul province.  
There are several explanations for the defeat of the democrats. First, in a four-
year period four governments had been formed. This displayed a degree of instability 
and a failure to provide leadership. Second, the various governments had made a series 
of mistakes on economic reform, as was demonstrated in Chapter 2. Third, the Coalition 
had split before the election and each party ran an independent slate of candidates. 
Therefore, the democrats had not fulfilled the peoples expectation. Although almost 
fifty percent of the people argued that living conditions under the communist regime 
were better than during the democratic transition period, voters feelings also seemed 
mixed about Mongolias communist past; the majority said that a return to communism 
was not a desirable choice.  
During the election, the most important concerns of the Mongolian people were 
unemployment and poverty. Furthermore, one party had controlled the government for 
almost 70 years and it had been difficult to beat. It had local-level organization, the 
support of some national newspapers and the peoples habits in voting for it. Half of the 
MPs nominated from the MPRP were former MPs while the other half were new to the 
parliament. This shows that people trusted the MPRP by voting for incumbent MPRP 
members of the parliament. New opposition parties and candidates clearly had no 
experience in policy-making whereas the MPRP members did. In Mongolia, the MPRP 
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is trusted as Mongolians express a strong culture of support for well-educated, 
experienced individuals during election.  
Party platforms are important in analyzing competing parties goals during 
elections. Political platforms offer a good indication of the possible future government 
program.   Here I will briefly introduce some of the parties slogans and platforms that 
were put forward throughout the 2000 election. People began to look at the slogans to 
help make their decisions, despite the fact that some people became cynical that parties 
could not keep their promises during the election campaign. For example, the MPRP 
slogan was Lets recover the state from the crisis and rescue the people from 
poverty.171 The MPRP focused on the instability of the previous coalition government. 
Also the partys platform emphasized its commitment to build the Millennium Road, a 
two-lane asphalt highway across Mongolia. The Millennium Road project was to be 
completed by 2011. With its completion, the country will be connected with Central and 
Northeast Asia. Promises of the Millennium Road project attracted many votes. 
 The Citizens Will Party / The Green Party Coalition slogan was, It will depend 
only on your civic courage.172 The new coalition platform was focused on the rule of 
law, and transparency and accountability in governance. The MNDP slogan was Your 
choice is the future of Mongolia.173 The slogan of the Motherland-Mongolian New 
Socialist Democratic Party (MNSDP or EREL Corporation) was Believe in Yourself 
and Do It Yourselves, however its reputation was centered on chairman B. Erdenebat, 
who also owned the sole business that funded his party. 
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When the MPRP came to power the new Prime Minister and chairman,               
N. Enkhbayar, officially stated that the new government would not introduce major 
changes in the transition process. The MPRP General Secretary, L. Enebish, became the 
new Speaker of Parliament. It was very hard, however, for the opposition to oppose the 
MPRP in government or in Parliament because the MPRP had control over both 
parliament and the presidency. This example demonstrates that Mongolia kept coming 
back to authoritarianism from democracy by the alternation of power every four years. 
This example demonstrates that power shifted from the more authoritarian to the 
democratic forces in alternate elections without a major disruption in the transition to 
democracy.  
The International Republican Institute observers and other international 
delegations observed the entire electoral process in the 2000 parliamentary election. 
They evaluated the whole election process starting from the pre-election period, 
election-day, the counting of ballots and until the transfer of power. Their report claims 
that the ongoing support of international NGOs such as the International Republican 
Institute, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Open Society/Soros Foundation, USAID, the 
Asia Foundation and others has been critical in helping build the oppositions election 
strategy and efficiency, in teaching citizens how to hold fair elections, and in 
encouraging all political parties to publicize their platforms.174 In general, the observers 
did not notice any systematic electoral irregularities, but there were some minor issues 
such as the lack of uniformity in voter registration, problem in the distribution of voter 
identity cards, the counting of absentee ballots and the improper use of mobile boxes.  
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Following the surprising results of the 2000 election, there was another important 
political event  the presidential elections on May 20, 2001 (See Appendix II Table 3). 
In the run-up to the election, presidential candidate R. Gonchigdorj, former Social 
Democratic Party leader and 19962000 State Great Hural Speaker, defeated former 
National Democrat and Prime Minister M. Enksaikhan and won the nomination as the 
newly-united Democratic Partys presidential candidate.175 The Citizens Will Party 
formed a coalition with the Mongolian Republican Party to nominate L. Dashnyam as its 
candidate for the presidency. Ultimately, the Democrats newly found unity was not 
enough to unseat N. Bagabandi, who won handily with 58 percent of the vote, compared 
with 36.5 percent for R. Gonchigdorj. The third contender, L. Dashnyam garnered 3.5 
percent of the vote.176  
The presidential election victory enhanced the MPRPs political dominance. 
It illustrated the democrats difficulties in rebuilding public confidence after their 
four tumultuous years in power. They made unpopular and painful decisions to 
liberalize Mongolias economy during that time, but four successive Democratic 
Coalition governments marked their rule, a corruption case, political stalemate 
exacerbated by the MPRP, and failure to improve the standard of living.177  
 
Despite the Democratic Partys appeals for a balance of power between the presidency 
and the parliament, the MPRP incumbent President N. Bagabandi won in an election that 
was widely viewed as free and fair. 
The MPRP, which adopted a social democratic doctrine in 1997, had worked to 
show the public and the world that the party had left its communist roots behind. 
They deepened the democrat-initiated economic reforms and generally 
maintained the environment of political and economic openness that Mongolia 
has enjoyed for the past decade.178 
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Both the 2000 and 2001 elections returned political power to the MPRP at the 
presidential and parliamentary levels. The 2001 democratic election demonstrated that 
peaceful transitions occurred in Mongolia, and further proved that elections became an 
important part of Mongolias transition to democracy. The fact that the parliamentary 
elections resulted in political power changing hands from the MPRP to the Democrats in 
1996, and then back to the MPRP in 2000, demonstrates that Mongolia conforms with 
the third stage of the second assumption, for example, Mongolia is consolidating 
democracy according to the transition paradigm which is critiqued by Carothers. 
 
The 2004 Elections 
The fifth parliamentary democratic election was held on the 27 of June, 2004. 
This time the democratic opposition decided to form a strong coalition because of 
lessons learned from the 2000 election experience. Prior to this election the two major 
incumbent opposition parties in parliament, the Mongolian New Socialist Democratic 
Party and the Citizens Will Party, joined with the Democratic Party to form the 
Motherland Democratic Coalition (MDC). Seven political parties and 15 independent 
candidates ran in the 2004 general election. Most often four or five candidates ran in 
each single member electoral district. Six parties ran in this election.179 
  The Motherland Democratic Coalition took 34 seats in the parliament while the 
MPRP fell from 72 seats to 36 (See Appendix III, V Table 4).180 B. Jargalsaikhan, leader 
of the Mongolian Republican Party and director of Buyan Cashmere Company, who had 
                                                
179 MPRP - Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party,  Democracy Coalition, RP - Republican Party, 
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run in three elections since 1992, finally won a seat. He is an example of an economic 
leader whose wealth helped to get him elected to parliament. Three independent 
winners, former Prime Minister R. Amarjargal, Yadamsuren Sanjmyatav, Democratic 
Party Chairman Zavkhanaimag, and Durzee Odhuu, Advisor to the NGO Altangadas 
Association, were former members of Democratic Party. The MPRP received 48.9 
percent of the vote (36 seats) while the MDC attained 44.65 percent (34 seats). Voter 
turnout was 82.3 percent. The result of the election was a surprise for Mongolians, but 
also for international observers and the outside world. Many people expected that the 
MPRP would win a majority of seats in parliament. They were surprised but glad, and 
wondered why the MPRP had not gained the majority.  
All the elected MPRP members of the parliament were former MPs at least two 
times elected and between the ages of 30 and 60 years, while only half of the elected 
MPs nominated by the Motherland Democratic Coalition were former MPs, including 
cabinet members who had served under previous Democratic governments. The other 
half elected were new to politics and the parliament. The newcomers, however, were all 
well known, successful businessmen running major companies in Mongolia. The 
Coalition selected their candidates from among the directors of large companies and 
former MPs from the 1996-2000 parliament. After this surprising election result, there 
remained the larger challenge of how to form a coalition government. 
To explain the election results, we need to analyze the party campaigns and the 
party platforms. Many factors affected the MPRPs loss of its majority and the 
surprising victory of the Coalition. Let us begin with the main factors related to the 
MPRP election campaign. The MPRPs election platform for the parliamentary election 
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in 2004 had as its slogan for you and with you/ your party and my party.181 The party 
promised that the MPRP would continue to pursue policies focusing on social security, 
the States increased attention to welfare policy and expanded public services for people 
of all ages. Great emphasis was placed on unemployment and poverty, and greater 
attention was devoted to public health and education. According to the platform, the 
MPRP would continue to implement the on-going major developmental programs, such 
as the Millennium Road project, though the opposition claimed that the project would 
take thousands of years to finish. The MPRP also promised to improve the efficiency of 
state services and to lessen bureaucracy. 
The Motherland Democratic Coalition presented a platform with 21 main aims to 
support the well-being of citizens, particularly families and children; to encourage 
businesses; and to put an end to authoritarian tendencies within the bureaucracy. The 
party slogan was Let's remove current pressures and support households.182 They 
suggested in their platform that they would implement a Money of Trust policy that 
would allocate and pay ten thousand tugrugs every month to all children below the age 
of 18.183 The Coalition addressed the fact that Mongolia has one million children. There 
was an assumption by people that this Money of Trust policy would attract many 
voters. The party intended to support households by providing social welfare, education, 
health care, and poverty reduction for the entire population with the hopes of 
encouraging people to benefit from a bright future. On the other hand, the Mongolian 
Republic Party platform promised to reform current banking and financial institutions 
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which were charging very high interest rates; to create opportunities and conditions to 
build private housing; to increase the salary of civil servants to US$ 300 per month, and 
to improve sustainability and accountability of the government. 
The new social welfare policies addressed by political parties during this election 
campaign showed that the parties had different views and approaches. Let us review 
why people changed their attitude towards the parties. One reason, as Ch. Tamir argues, 
is that the general factor that [influenced] the MPRP to lose the election was a peoples 
psychology of tiredness.184 Indeed, the MPRP alone had won victories in all elections 
since 1996, including the 1996 local election, the 1997 Presidential election, the 1997 
by-elections, the 2000 parliament election, the 2000 local elections, the 2001 
Presidential election, and the 2002 by-elections. Often people get bored, if the outcome 
is always the same. In sum, the rationale behind Ch.  Tamirs explanation for the 
election results is basically that the people wanted to try new ideas, to experiment with 
new choices and new images, and to imagine themselves as a new people with a new 
political force and new policies.  
Another reason given for the MPRPs defeat is that the partys advertising 
campaign was overwhelming because it was posted everywhere, including on the TV 
news. This demonstrated that the MPRP still maintained its power over the broadcast 
media. For example, a Soros Foundation monitoring survey reported that the MPRP 
political advertisements alone took up 96 percent of the total advertisement time on 
radio by the first four weeks of the election campaign.185  Voters were turned off by the 
MPRPs aggressive campaigning and this caused the vote to swing to the Motherland 
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Democracy Coalition to balance political forces. In the 2000 election there were many 
party candidates competing in each district. With so many options it was difficult for 
voters to choose who would represent them. Inevitably, all the opposition parties split 
votes. Compared to the 2000 election, the 2004 election saw the opposition parties form 
an effective coalition. In the 2004 election the two main political forces were the 
Motherland Democratic Coalition and the MPRP.   
Apart from this, the 2004 election saw more misdeeds than ever. Both competing 
parties in this election were involved in organized fraud. As Andreas Schedler notes, 
election fraud is extremely complicated: 
Anyone familiar with the often-messy business of monitoring elections knows 
that vote fraud can be a very complicated, shadowy, and slippery affair that 
causes domestic and international observers to pull their hair out by the handful. 
Much practical knowledge and painstaking methodological analysis have gone 
toward devising methods that allow monitors to distinguish massive fraud from 
widespread but unsystematic irregularities, but the results so far are hardly 
conclusive.186 
 
Although they tried to reveal each other's misdeeds after the election, both parties 
cheated by, for example, tampering with voters lists, pre-distributing ballot papers, 
transporting a mass of transferred voters, counterfeiting ballot papers, and invalidating 
opponents votes. The MPRP accused the Democrats of cheating in the election. They 
abused the power of incumbency to monopolize state-controlled radio and television. 
The MPRP was able to abuse their political power because Election Law Article 10 
states that, Parties represented at the State Great Hural shall be financially supported 
from the state budget according to the number of seats they hold. The amount of 
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financing and the procedure thereby shall be determined by the State Great Hural.187 
This provision favors the political party dominating in parliament, because it allows the 
party with the majority to receive funding proportionate to the number of seats it holds 
and the MPRP had by far the largest number of MPs. 
In August 2004, after the election, the parties in parliament recognized the 
necessity for cooperation given the election results. They began negotiations to form a 
coalition government although the process was slow. They compromised in the 
formation of a coalition government composed equally of the Democratic Coalition and 
the MPRP. Former Prime Minister MPRP N. Enkhbayar was appointed as Speaker of 
the Parliament.  After several weeks of negotiations, Ts. Elbegdorj, who had already 
served as a Prime Minister in the Democratic Coalition government of 1997, was 
appointed as Prime Minister. This new government was only the second Democratic 
administration in power following decades of MPRP rule. To facilitate their task, a 
group of MPs went to Israel to learn how to work in a coalition setting. The newly-
appointed Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament divested the government of 
National Radio and TV stations and thus abolished state control. Further, parliament 
appointed a committee to reform election laws that had caused difficulties and fraud in 
the past elections. This 2004 election was a key milestone because it brought about 
further democratic consolidation. The political parties received equal representation and 
had to share power in the parliament. This shows that Mongolia is making a peaceful 
and stable transition to democracy 
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The results of the 2004 election were surprising. Two major political entities, 
namely the MPRP and the hastily created Motherland-Democracy Coalition, took nearly 
an equal number of seats, 36 and 34, respectively. One of the remaining four seats went 
to a small party leader and independent candidates took the other three, leaving two 
disputed seats under judicial review. As a result of the lack of a clear-cut majority of 39 
constitutionally prescribed for the appointment of the cabinet, the two previous political 
parties instead formed the so-called Grand Coalition Cabinet, and divided the ministerial 
portfolios equally. To minimize the likelihood of election fraud and help ensure fair 
election practices, the State Great Hural reformed electoral laws after the 2004 election.  
 
Conclusion 
Many people traveled hours across difficult terrain in order to let their voices be 
heard during the elections. The Mongolian peoples spirit and their tireless efforts to 
practice their newly won democracy inspired widespread optimism. The extremely high 
voter turnout during the elections demonstrates that Mongolians are dedicated to 
strengthening democracy through successive elections. The 2004 election is a highlight 
in the Mongolian democratic transition because power successfully and peacefully 
changed hands again as it had in the 1996 and 2000 elections.  
 In sum, Mongolias elections can be considered free and fair; they certainly 
improved democracy during the transition period as the third assumption in the 
paradigm predicts. However, Carothers argues that simply holding elections will not 
necessarily improve political participation and the stability of government. In the case of 
Mongolia, his critique is relevant because the election system is still susceptible to flaws 
and election laws are continually being reformed to better Mongolias election system. 
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The strengthening of political institutions and civil society contributed in a major way to 
stabilizing democracy, hence while necessary, election alone did not ensure democracy. 
Although Mongolia made significant democratic changes, it was not immune to 
state-building problems during this transition. This is in agreement with the fifth 
assumption of the transition paradigm that states that democracy promoters pay more 
attention to democracy-building than to state-building. Due to the past Soviet influences 
and structures previously in place, the state-building processes remained compromised. 
Institutions such as political parties faced many challenges during the transition period. 
Furthermore, Mongolia had made significant changes with respect to the laws governing 
elections. While there were many individuals and groups that promoted democracy they 
often neglected the intricacies involved in state-building. For example, although election 
law contributed to the countrys successful democratic transition, it was not overnight 
that fair elections occurred. Moreover, laws often were passed that favored the majority 
government when going into an election.  As was demonstrated in this chapter, the 
introduction of numerous electoral reforms and reform committees were required to 
ensure that the electoral system would be acceptable by international standards. By 
overcoming these unavoidable state-building problems Mongolia has demonstrated a 
peaceful transition to democracy.  
Carothers has argued that once a country has fairly regular elections, it not only 
guarantees a new government democratic legitimacy, but also promotes deep democratic 
participation and accountability that will serve to strengthen democracy.188 As has been 
demonstrated, currently Mongolia holds regular elections that are competitive (in that 
major opposition parties and candidates participate), and generally free of massive fraud. 
                                                
188 Carothers, 8. 
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The following chapter will bring together the paradigms assumptions and demonstrate 
that Mongolia is still in the consolidation stage of its transition to democracy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The central objective of this thesis has been to examine Mongolias transition to 
democracy from an authoritarian one-party system. Mongolia is a fascinating country 
which has undergone, within a short period of time, a massive transformation from an 
authoritarian political system with a state controlled and directed economy to democratic 
system with a free market economy. The objective in this concluding chapter is to 
summarize and interpret the findings.  
 
Findings 
Mongolia is a country that has proven its democratic achievement within the last 
decade and has taken the steps necessary to promote further democratization. The 
transition paradigm states that those countries making the transition to democracy will 
fulfill five requirements. These are the five core assumptions of the paradigm. However, 
Carothers has challenged the applicability of these assumptions.  This section will 
provide a summary of how Mongolia meets these assumptions and it will determine the 
relevance of Carothers critiques by taking into account the Mongolian experience.  
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The first assumption of the ODonnell and Schmitter paradigm states that 
countries moving away from an authoritarian regime are automatically in transition to 
democracy. Carothers argues that this is not the case for all of countries; many countries 
lie in the grey zone between authoritarianism and democracy. Where some countries 
have faltered and remain grounded or stalled in this grey zone, Mongolia has succeeded 
in its transition to democracy.  Not only has Mongolia conducted fundamental political 
and economic reforms simultaneously, but its political leaders have displayed an 
unexpected degree of maturity in both conceding the inevitable, and in crafting a 
coalition-formation process which recognizes and accommodates the realities of 
electoral outcomes. Furthermore, Mongolia has seen the emergence and 
institutionalization of various organizations within its now vibrant civil society. For 
example, the NGO community that has expanded dramatically within the last 15 years, 
and now there are approximately 2000 in existence.  Because of these developments 
Mongolia has avoided the grey zone that Carothers says many countries will fall into. 
Based on the findings of this research, the Mongolian case demonstrates that the first 
assumption of the transition paradigm applies for Mongolia and that it is not an example 
of a country that falls in Carothers grey zone.  
The second assumption of the paradigm states that there is a sequential process 
that countries will follow while moving to democracy: political opening, democratic 
breakthrough and democratic consolidation. Carothers maintains that many countries do 
not necessarily follow these stages.  Mongolia, however, is a case that does conform to 
these three stages.  Mongolias experience during the first stage, political opening, 
occurred when the dictatorial regime began to break down and space was created for 
democracy promoters. During this opening stage the Mongolians overturned the ruling 
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dictatorial regime during the 1990 strikes and demonstrations. This political opening 
was crafted very carefully by civil society leaders who did not want to foster dramatic 
state repression. This political opening was demonstrated in Chapter Two which 
discusses how the younger generation began to advocate for a free media and engaging 
in a broad range of discussions about human rights and multi-party elections. In 
establishing a variety of influential organizations these individuals became the leaders of 
the democratic movement the creation of which is an essential component of stage two.  
The next stage, the breakthrough, saw the collapse of the old regime and the 
rapid emergence of genuine political liberalization. This created democratic openings 
and allowed new governments to alternate in power in both the 1992 and 1996 national 
elections. Mongolia also saw the establishment of a democratic institutional structure 
through a new constitution that was created in 1992. Furthermore, the vibrant civil 
society that developed continually pressured the government to maintain the democratic 
momentum. For example, the young intellectuals who organized the Mongolian 
Democratic Union sought to represent the interests of the masses. They were determined 
to wrest power away from the older conservative leaders of the communist era. 
Moreover, the MPRPs flexibility in response to the pressures of democracy should be 
emphasized. In 2000, the MPRP revised its party objectives and adopted the theory of 
social democracy. Thus the former communist partys adaptability ensured its continued 
presence on the political stage and helped to create a stable democratic environment. 
Democratic consolidation is the last stage identified in the second assumption of 
the transition paradigm. The Mongolian government has made numerous reforms that 
have both allowed and promoted the continued development of democracy.  Democratic 
consolidation includes strengthening civil society, political party development, and 
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reforming state institutions. For example, during the late 1980s many students and 
members of the younger generation came together to form political groups which 
evolved into political parties that remain influential to this day. Mongolias civil society 
has played a crucial role in its democratization and the research in this thesis 
demonstrated that the Mongolian Democratic Union was one of the influential civil 
society actors.  
Another essential development was the emergence of the coalition form of 
governance. Due the results of the 2004 elections, the MPRP and the Democrats are now 
in a power-sharing relationship with equal representation in parliament. This new 
democratic path may guarantee a decline of corruption as both parties in parliament 
closely monitor each other. It is also useful to note that, as Samuel Huntington suggests, 
democratization has occurred when there have been two clear regime changes through 
an open, competitive and fair electoral process. In the case of Mongolia, there have been 
three regime changes. The first election saw a regime change, the second election 
brought the MPRP back to power, and finally in 2004 a new coalition regime was 
formed. Appendix I captures the time frame of the crucial regime changes which took 
place in Mongolia during the consolidation phase.  
With respect to Carothers critique of the paradigm, Mongolia conformed to the 
transitional path from political opening and breakthrough to consolidation. Although 
Carothers states that not all countries will follow these three stages, Mongolia is an 
example of a country that did. This demonstrates that in the case of Mongolia this 
caution does not apply.  
 The third assumption of the transition paradigm states that free and fair elections 
are all that is required to call a country a democracy. However, Carothers argues that 
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simply holding elections will not necessarily improve political participation and the 
stability of government. Carothers caution that elections alone do not necessary lead to 
democracy is confirmed in Mongolian case. The problematic elections held in 1996 and 
2004 confirm that the system is still susceptible to flaws. It is possible that these flaws 
could be rectified with further reforms to the electoral system. Regardless of these flaws, 
Mongolia has made exceptional strides in its transition to democracy. Its democratic 
electoral system allows multiple political parties to participate and has been 
characterized by a high voter turn out. This is especially impressive given that only 15 
years ago the system had been dominated by single party rule. But the strengthening of 
political institutions and civil society contributed in a major way to stabilizing 
democracy; hence while necessary, election alone did not ensure democracy. Carothers 
cautions that elections alone do not necessarily lead to a democracy, thus the case study 
of Mongolia confirms Carothers critique of the transition paradigm.  
The fourth assumption of the transition paradigm states that social and economic 
factors affect the transition to democracy.  Carothers, however, argues that the paradigm 
does not adequately emphasize the preconditions for democracy that existed prior to the 
transition. He argues that the economic, political, and social characteristics of the 
country that existed prior to the transition strongly affect its transition to democracy. 
This research finds that these preconditions were important for Mongolias transition to 
democracy. First, Mongolia had been heavily dependent on economic assistance from 
the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the CMEA system affected 
Mongolias decision to make economic reforms and move towards democracy. Second, 
alongside Mikhail Gorbachevs economic reforms, his foreign and domestic initiatives 
towards rekindling Sino-Soviet relations influenced Mongolias own political actions. 
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Third, the civil society in Mongolia began to accept Gorbachevs policy reforms. An 
active young generation which promoted these reforms helped to set in motion this shift 
in civil society. These actions and changes in civil society formed the basis for the social 
preconditions that moved Mongolia towards democracy.  The case study of Mongolia 
confirms the importance of the economic, political and social historical preconditions 
because without the external factor of the Soviet Union, Mongolia may not have been 
pushed towards democracy.  Hence, Carothers argument that historical preconditions 
affect a countrys democratic transition has been confirmed by this case study. 
 The fifth assumption of the transition paradigm states that democracy promoters 
pay more attention to democracy-building than to state-building. In doing so, they 
neglect to take into consideration that state-building provides the backbone for 
democracy-building.  Carothers argues that state-building (the introduction of new 
electoral and political institutions and the strengthening of civil society) is very complex 
and that scholars should not ignore these challenges to democracy. Mongolia 
demonstrates just how challenging it can be to focus on state-building while 
simultaneously building a democracy. Although Mongolias civil society had begun to 
develop in the late 1980s, and had become considerably influential by 1992, the process 
of state-building has been continual throughout the last 15 years of the countrys 
transition period. For example, Mongolia faced setbacks during state-building because 
of election fraud. Although election laws have contributed to the countrys successful 
democratic transition, fair elections cannot be implemented overnight. Nevertheless, 
each reform has helped to mitigate the chances of fraud in Mongolias political system.  
The process of reforming the electoral and political institutions is an ongoing challenge 
that Mongolia must address.  Mongolia demonstrates the complexity of the state-
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building process which Carothers argues is so challenging, yet important, during the 
transitional process.  
 This chapter has provided an overview of the five assumptions in the transition 
paradigm and Carothers critiques against them. In summary, Carothers critiques are 
validated and hold true in the case of Mongolia. Mongolia moved towards democracy 
without stalling in the grey-zone that Carothers says may exist, but not all countries fall 
into.  Therefore, Mongolia is an example of a country that has transcended a possible 
grey zone.   His caution was proved irrelevant in the Mongolian case. Mongolia 
conforms well to the three stages outlined by the transition paradigm in assumption two. 
The transition paradigm is validated in the case of Mongolia, however, Carotherss 
critiques highlighted the more complicated process that countries transitioning to 
democracy must go through.   
 Not only was the validity of Carothers critique of assumptions one and two 
demonstrated by this case study, his critique of assumptions three, four and five is also 
applicable; Carothers critiques are well founded. With respect to assumption three, 
Mongolias electoral system has not been immune from flaws and there is ample room 
for improvement in this area of democracy.  With respect to Carothers critique of 
assumption four, the findings also prove that the historical preconditions in Mongolia 
did impact the countrys decision to move towards democracy.  And, lastly, with respect 
to Carothers critique of assumption five, Mongolia has confirmed the importance of 
considering state-building aspects while promoting democracy; state-building provides 
the backbone to effective democracy-building. Although these cautions do apply for 
Mongolia, we cannot be sure that Mongolia would not have become a democracy were 
these conditions absent.  
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Mongolias future democratic prospects look quite promising. The increasing 
involvement of young people in politics who are committed to democratization makes 
one even more optimistic about Mongolias democratic future. The dimension of 
generational change in the ranks of the political leadership in Mongolia makes continued 
success even more likely and helps to assure the continuation of the momentum for 
political change. The young generation is not willing to return to the old regime and its 
anti-democratic ways. The new younger political actors are the product of the 
democratization movement. 189They are committed to it and will ensure that the 
consolidation process continues to take place in the Mongolian political system. 
The findings of this thesis also revealed that civil society has grown during 
Mongolias transition to democracy. It is through the many NGOs that citizens are able 
to represent their interests. Many of the national NGOs are run by women who focus on 
gender-specific concerns. Comparatively, women are more actively engaged in civil 
society in Mongolia than men and they could contribute greatly to Mongolia if they were 
to be elected into crucial political positions. Moreover, women currently in Parliament 
have improved their professional competency since the 1980s. However, women are still 
the minority in Parliament and their representation in politics is still limited. There has 
been limited research into this area and actionable recommendations are required in 
order to increase womens participation and representation in politics in Mongolia.  
 Overall, by international standards for a transitioning country, Mongolia has 
made remarkable progress in the last decade. Mongolia is a good example of a 
                                                
189 This generational change is a new trend within democratic consolidation. In the 2004 parliamentary 
elections B. Erdeneburen became the youngest MP in the State Great Hural. Generally, the 2004 election 
results show that the younger generation is coming into power. Even the staid, conservative MPRP is 
trying to recruit more young party members and provide opportunities for young leaders to lead the 
country. Moreover, in the new coalition government, the majority of the ministers are relatively young 
people ranging from 30 to 50 years of age (See Appendix VI, Table 4). 
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consolidating democratic system in Central Asia. Unlike other Asian countries, 
Mongolia is challenging and breaking the stereotype of alternating between 
authoritarianism and democracy. The main conclusion reached is that Mongolia has 
accomplished this by undertaking concurrent political and economic reforms in a 
peaceful manner which has contributed to the countrys success. Mongolians are 
obviously proud of the democratic steps taken in the last fifteen years.  
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Appendix I: Timeline of Key Events in Mongolia during the transition  
Date Event 
July 1984- The General Secretary of the MPRP Yu. Tsedendal replaced by Jambin Batmunkh 
1986- Economic reforms beginnings of the perestroika and the glasnost 
1987- The MPRP announced agreement for withdrawal of the Soviet Motor Rifle Division 
Jan 27, 1987 - Diplomatic relations established with the United States 
May 1989- Sino-Soviet summit 
Dec 1989 - First popular reform demonstrations. The Mongolian Democratic Association organized 
Jan 1990 - Large scale demonstrations demanding democracy held in sub-zero weather 
Feb 18, 1990 Jambim Batmunkh resigns with entire Politburo 
Mar 2, 1990 - Soviets and Mongolians announce that all the Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Mongolia by 1992 
May 1990 - New Constitution amended to provide for multi-party system and new elections 
July 29, 1990- The first democratic elections held 
Sep 3, 1990 - The first democratically elected the People's Great Hural takes office 
Feb 12, 1992  New constitution goes into effect 
Apr 4, 1992 - New election law passed 
Jun 28, 1992 - Election for the first unicameral legislature (The State Great Hural) 
Jun 6, 1993 - The first direct presidential election won by Punsalmaa Ochirbat. 
Jun 30, 1996 - Election of the first noncommunist government 
July 2, 2000-  
Election of the former communist Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary 
Party (MPRP); formation of new government by Prime Minister 
Nambarin  Enkhbayar 
April 2001 - The second presidential election won by Natsagin Bagabandi. 
Nov. 2002 - The land privatization 
Jun 28, 2004 - Fourth parliamentary election , which formed first coalition government 
Dec. 2004 - Russian Federation canceled debt to the Former Soviet Union 
                                                
 Source: J.Bolbaatar, M.Sanjdorj and B.Shirendev. History of Mongolia vol5, Mongolian Scientific 
Academy Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2003, and 1990 - 2005  authors own data. 
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May 22, 2005-  Fourth Presidential election won by Nambarin Enkhbayar. 
 
 
Appendix II: POLITICAL DATA  
 
Name of the State: Mongolia 
Form of the Government: Republic Semi-presidential Westminster system 
Structure of the Legislature: Unicameral legislature, State Great Hural (Ulsin Ikh 
Hural) 
Size of the territory: 1.6 million square kilometers 
Size of the Population: 2, 504.000 (2003) 
 
 
PRESIDENTIONAL ELECTION RESULTS 1993- 2001 
 
Table 1:  
 
Presidential Election, 6 June 1993 
 
Turnout: 92.7% 
 
Candidate     Votes    % of Vote 
Punsalmaagin Ochirbat   592,836   57.8 
Lodoin Tudev     397,057   38.7  
 
Invalid      36,077    3.5 
Total valid     989,893   96.5  
Number of voters listed   1,106,403 
 
 
Table 2 
  
Presidential Election, 19 May 1997 
 
Turnout: 85.1% 
  
Candidate     Votes    % of Vote 
Natsagin Bagabandi    597,573   60.8 
Punsalmaagin Ochirbat   292,896   29.8 
Jambin Gombojav    65,201    6.6  
 
                                                
 Source: National Statistics Office of Mongolia, Statistics 2003 (Ulaanbaatar, 2003) 
Gunfsambuu Khayanhyarva, Social Stratification In Contemporary Mongolian Society  Zotol Club of 
Professional Sociologist (Ulaanbaatar 2002) and J. Yadamsuren, Democratic Election Data, Election 
Commission (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2002), 93-118. 
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Invalid      26,970    2.7 
Total valid     955,670   97.3  
Number of voters listed   1,155,228 
 
Table 3  
 
Presidential Election, 20 May 2001 
 
Turnout: 82.9% 
  
Candidate     Votes    % of Vote 
Natsagin Bagabandi    581,381   58.1 
Radnasumbrelin Gonchigdorj   365,363   36.5 
Luvsannyamin Dashnyam   35,425    3.5  
 
Invalid      17,411    1.7 
Total valid     982,714   98.3  
Number of voters listed   1,205,885 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix III:  Votes and Seats in the Parliamentary Elections 1992-2004  
                                                
  Source: J. Yadamsuren, Democratic Election Data, Election Commission (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2002), 
93-118. 
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Table 1 
 
Parliamentary Election, 28 June 1992 
 
Turnout: 95% 
 
Party Coalition      Seats 
MPRP          70 
Democratic, National Progress 
And United Parties Alliances     4 
MSDP        1 
Independents       1 
Total        76 
 
Table 2 
 
Parliamentary Election, 30 June 1996 
 
Turnout: 92% 
 
Party Coalition      Seats 
DUC        50 
MPRP          25 
Mongolian Traditional United Party     1 
Total        76 
 
Table 3 
 
Parliamentary Election, 2 July 2000 
 
Turnout: 82% 
 
Party Coalition      Seats 
MPRP          72 
MNDP-MRDP      1 
Mongolian New Socialist Democratic Party   1 
Citizens Will/Green Party Coalition    1 
Independents       1 
Total        76 
                                                                                                                                           
 Source: J. Yadamsuren, Democratic Election Data, Election Commission (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2002), 
3-59. 
International Republican Institute. Mongolia Parliament Election Observation Mission Report.  
Washington D.C: IRI, July, 2000. 
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Table 4  
 
Parliamentary Election, 27 June 2004 
 
Turnout: 82% 
 
Party Coalition      % of Vote  Seats 
MPRP               47.3   36 
Motherland Democratic Coalition    44.7   34 
Mongolian Republican Party     1.47   1 
Independents       3.9   3 
 
Invalid           2 
Total           76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 Source: General Election Commission of Mongolia website: http://www.gec.gov.mn/ (Retrieved  12 
August 2004.) 
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Appendix IV: Voter turnout, Parliamentary and Presidential Elections  
 
 
Year of election     Voter turnout 
 
1992 Parliamentary      95.60%  
    
1993 Presidential      92.7% 
 
1996 Parliamentary   
   92.15% 
 
1997 Presidential   85.06% 
 
2000 Parliamentary      82.43% 
 
2001 Presidential      82.94% 
 
2004 Parliamentary  82.3% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
Source: J. Yadamsuren, Democratic Election Data, Election Commission (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2002), 
3-118 
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Appendix V: Parliamentary Election Results  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
  Source: Authors data. 
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Appendix VI: Parliamentary Election Results  
 
Table 1 
Parliamentary Election 1992: MPs Elected 
Name of the MP   Party   Votes  % of Vote 
1. M.Dalaikhuu   MPRP   19,823  46.3 
2. Ch.Purevdorj   MPRP   23,573  55.0 
3. R.Gonchigdorj  Dem All  30,527  71.2 
4. A.Bolat   MPRP   26,349  67.2 
5. H.Volodya   MPRP   21,481  54.8 
6. T.Sultan   MPRP   23,775  60.6 
7. D.Gombo   MPRP   20,621  56.3 
8. D.Dashtseden   MPRP   20,270  55.3 
9. G.Tserendavga  MPRP   21,590  58.9 
10. J.Boldbaatar   MPRP   18,541  67.9 
11. S.Gundenbal   MPRP   16,920  62.0 
12. A.Bazarkhuu   MPRP   18,698  62.3 
13. G.Zuunai/B.Alzahgui Independent  12,246  40.8 
14. Yo.Adilbish   MPRP   20,065  70.8 
15. Ts.Sharavdorj   MPRP   18,389  64.9 
16. D.Bazarsad   MPRP   20,211  58.9 
17. D.Dagvasuren  MPRP   19,293  56.2 
18. Ts.Turmandakh  MPRP   19,859  57.8 
19. S.Batmunkh   MPRP   11,271  49.1 
20. N.Togtokh   MPRP   11,065  48.2 
21. N.Bagabandi   MPRP   31,169  70.6 
22. Ts.Nyamhkhainyambuu MPRP   29,250  66.3 
23. S.Nyamzagd   MPRP   28,111  63.7 
24. Sh.Batbayar   MPRP   25,257  53.3 
25. O.Batmunkh   MPRP   26,086  55.0 
26. J.Batsuuri   MPRP   25,812  54.4 
27. D.Lundeejantsan  MPRP   31,590  66.6 
28. D.Idevkhten   MPRP   12,241  59.4 
29. R.Tsagaankhuu  MPRP   12,576  61.0 
30. J.Gombojav   MPRP   17,924  70.3 
31. Ch.Khurts   MPRP   13,647  53.6 
32. B.Demberel   MPRP   23,944  59.0 
33. D.Munkhuu   MPRP   27,666  68.2 
34. Ch.Zorigtbaatar  MPRP   23,305  57.4 
                                                
Source:  J. Yadamsuren, Democratic Election Data, Election Commission (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2002), 
7-8 
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35. Ch.Dashdemberel  MPRP   37,080  75.8 
36. B.Lkhagvasuren  MPRP   34,559  70.6 
37. M.Zenee   MPRP   31,982  65.4 
38. M.Mendbileg   MPRP   29,548  60.4 
39. N.Bayartsaikhan  MPRP   32,366  81.2 
40. S.Tumur   MPRP   32,745  82.2 
41. O.Shaalai   MPRP   28,259  70.9 
42. J.Byambadorj   MPRP   27,941  76.6 
43. D.Demberel   MPRP   26,218  71.8 
44. J.Norovsambuu  MPRP   30,465  83.5 
45. B.Chimed   MPRP   28,176  55.5 
46. Ts.Elbegdorj/R.Odonbaatar Dem All  28,022  55.2 
47. D.Danzan   MPRP   25,216  49.7 
48. G.Turtogtoh   MPRP   20,678  40.7 
49. N.Ganbyamba  MPRP   16,539  48.6 
50. Ch.Gan-Ulzii   MPRP   13,725  40.3 
51. D.Ganbold   Dem All  15,800  46.4 
52. N.Jantsannorov/T.ErdenebilegMPRP  19,902  56.8 
53. Ch.Bayanjargal  MPRP   19,008  54.2 
54. J.Jadambaa   MPRP   18,659  53.2 
55. J.Delgertsetseg  MPRP   13,770  60.6 
56. Sh.Chunag   MPRP   10,903  48.0 
57. Ts.Nyamdorj   MPRP   15,302  50.3 
58. S.Chuluunbaatar  MPRP   14,643  48.2 
59. T.Ochikhuu   MPRP   31,513  54.2 
60. J.Byambajav   MPRP   31,497  54.2 
61. D.Batbaatar   MPRP   30,958  53.2 
62. N.Jalbajav   MPRP   27,132  46.7 
63. G.Ganbold   MPRP   18,723  50.0 
64. S.Zorig   Dem All  17,242  46.0 
65. N.Enkhbayar   MPRP   16,487  44.0 
66. J.Urtnasan   MPRP   19,419  51.4 
67. Ts.Ganbat   MPRP   19,177  50.8 
68. L.Enebish   MPRP   29,135  56.7 
69. T.Gandi   MPRP   27,840  54.1 
70. Ts.Gombosuren  MPRP   26,600  51.7 
71. S.Narangerel   MPRP   23,804  46.3 
72. P.Jasrai   MPRP   32,717  63.9 
73. J.Algaa   MPRP   24,325  47.5 
74. B.Ganbold   MPRP   23,221  45.4  
75. A.Ganbaatar   MSDP   18,416  36.0 
76. Ts.Tovuusuren  MPRP   17,020  45.1  
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Table 2 
Parliamentary Election 1996: MPs Elected  
Name of the MP   Party   Votes  % of Vote 
1. R.Gonchigdorj  DUC   11,653  71.1 
2. S.Tumur-Ochir  MPRP   5,538  38.4 
3. S.Lambaa   DUC   8,878  60.4 
4. R.Sandalhan   MPRP   6,701  66.3 
5. T.Sultan   MPRP   5,343  48.3 
6. A.Bolat   MPRP   6,044  47.6 
7. Yo.Gerelchuluun  DUC   6,721  59.8 
8. D.Batnasan   DUC   7,394  59.7 
9. Ts.Elbegdorj   DUC   9,412  64.6 
10. Ya.Erkhembayar  DUC   7,214  47.8 
11. D.Dashpurev   DUC   7,378  48.9 
12. P.Jasrai   MPRP   10,882  67.8 
13. A.Bazarkhuu   MPRP   9,624  59.8 
14. Yo.Adilbish   MPRP   8,199  61.8 
15. Ts.Sharavdorj   MPRP   9,344  61.7 
16. D.Enkhbaatar   DUC   5,724  59.5 
17. S.Zorig/S.Oyun(by-election) DUC   7,645  64.6 
18. S.Bilegsaikhan  DUC   7,531  58.4 
19. N.Togtokh   MPRP   4,351  34.8 
20. J.Otgonbayar   DUC   5,687  51.1 
21. N.Bagabandi   MPRP   7,533  55.0 
22. Ts.Gankhuyag   DUC   9,550  59.4 
23. N.Battsereg   DUC   8,550  54.3 
24. Kh.Dashzeveg   DUC   5,379  47.2 
25. R.Badamdamdin  DUC   7,895  62.9 
26. D.Lundeejantsan  MPRP   7,381  54.7 
27. Sh.Batbayar   MPRP   5,006  36.9 
28. Ch.Otgonbayar  DUC   4,998  44.5 
29. Ts.Bayarsaikhan  DUC   6,426  61.1 
30. Ch.Ulaan   MPRP   7,784  60.4 
31. O.Dashbalbar   MTUP   5,400  37.4 
32. D.Tsogt-Ochir   DUC   8,146  53.7 
33. S.Bayartsogt   DUC   8,695  58.0 
                                                
  Source:  J. Yadamsuren, Democratic Election Data, Election Commission (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2002), 
9-34 
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34. R.Sodkhuu   MPRP   5,943  46.7 
35. D.Ganbold   DUC   7,733  53.3 
36. M.Zenee   MPRP   6,143  62.4 
37. S.Gonchig/Ts.Uuld  MPRP   6,020  48.7 
38. U.Narantsatsralt  DUC   5,957  49.2 
39. Ts.Nyamdorj   MPRP   6,306  55.1 
40. N.Bayartsaikhan  MPRP   9,115  62.6 
41. S.Tumur   MPRP   9,512  67.4 
42. J.Byambadorj   MPRP   5,364  54.6 
43. J.Norovsambuu  MPRP   9,241  64.8 
44. D.Demberel   MPRP   6,846  46.5 
45. D.Tsogbadrakh  DUC   5,804  44.6 
46. E.Bat-Uul   DUC   8,422  61.5 
47. R.Odonbaatar   DUC   7,441  54.7 
48. D.Bokhisharga  DUC   7,011  47.5 
49. D.Ganbold   DUC   7,484  64.5 
50. N.Tuvshintugs  DUC   7,671  63.0 
51. O.Enkhtuya   DUC   6,334  60.6 
52. T.Erdenebileg   DUC   7,823  70.6 
53. M.Chimedtseren/D.TseveenjavDUC   5,265  47.5 
54. Sh.Batbayar   DUC   5,913  47.8 
55. L.Luvsan-Ochir  DUC   7,326  53.9 
56. D.Enkhtaivan   DUC   8,407  62.6 
57. S.Boldkhet   DUC   8,266  53.1 
58. Kh.Hulan   DUC   7,710  54.3 
59. Ts.Tumurtogoo  DUC   7,120  46.6 
60. S.Batchuluun   DUC   7,913  43.8 
61. T.Ochirkhuu   MPRP   5,442  39.2 
62. G.Gankhuyag   DUC   8,006  51.3 
63. B.Batbayar   DUC   6,736  52.4 
64. R.Amarjargal   DUC   8,673  58.2 
65. T.Gandi   MPRP   5,382  40.6 
66. J.Gombojav   MPRP   4,313  33.4 
67. A.Ganbaatar   DUC   7,174  50.1 
68. Ch.Saikhanbileg  DUC   8,394  61.9 
69. N.Altankhuyag  DUC   7,565  52.5 
70. D.Battulga   DUC   6,711  51.4 
71. Batjargalin Batbayar  DUC   6,202  45.5 
72. R.Narangerel   DUC   5,402  45.9 
73. D.Khuvituguldur  DUC   6,587  47.0 
74. Lu.Bold   DUC   6,594  53.0 
75. B.Delgermaa   DUC   5.465  52.6 
76. Ts.Enkhtuvshin  DUC   6,247  49.0 
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Table 3 
Parliamentary Election 2000: MPs Elected  
Name of the MP   Party   Votes  % of Vote 
1. B.Chadraa   MPRP   7,498  46.65 
2. S.Tumur-Ochir  MPRP   4,723  34.37 
3. M.Dalaikhuu   MPRP   7,456  52.94 
4. R.Sandalhan   MPRP   6,974  61.1 
5. O.Nigamet   MPRP   5,692  46.0 
6. H.Jekei   MPRP   7,103  50.22 
7. D.Tumendemberel  MPRP   4,304  37.7 
8. Ts.Shiirevdamba  MPRP   5,446  42.0 
9. S.Dulam   MPRP   7,151  50.01 
10. Ch.Radnaa   MPRP   8,946  60.95 
11. L.Enebish   MPRP   11,306  80.57 
12. P.Jasrai   MPRP   9,868  62.85 
13. R.Tsogtbaatar   MPRP   6,201  40.41 
14. L.Odonchimed  MPRP   8,732  66.12 
15. Ts.Sharavdorj   MPRP   7,361  46.28 
16. B.Baatarzorig   MPRP   3,583  44.74 
17. S.Oyun   Citizens Will-Green 6,515  50.99 
18. D.Bazarsad   MPRP   5,618  52.78 
19. N.Togtokh   MPRP   5,273  43.34 
20. J.Narantsastsralt  MNDP-MRDP 6,875  63.61 
21. B.Sharavsambuu  MPRP   6,295  49.86 
22. Sh.Otgonbileg   MPRP   11,489  78.16 
23. D.Oyunkhorol   MPRP   8,257  52.22 
24. D.Sugar   MPRP   6,028  53.68 
25. D.Dembereltseren  MPRP   4,940  39.92 
26. D.Lundeejantsan  MPRP   8,187  61.15 
27. B.Erdenebilegt  MPRP   6,546  43.97 
28. Ts.Oyunbaatar  MPRP   6,672  55.16 
29. B.Dolgor   MPRP   5,715  52.76 
30. Ch.Ulaan   MPRP   7,313  57.47 
31. Sh.Badam   MPRP   6,395  42.5 
32. P.Nyamdavaa   MPRP   7,981  53.30 
33. Sh.Gungaadorj  MPRP   7,987  56.12 
                                                
Source:  International Republican Institute. Mongolia Parliament Election Observation Mission Report. 
(Washington D.C: IRI, July, 2000), 111-142  
J. Yadamsuren, Democratic Election Data, Election Commission (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 2002), 7-9 
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34. R.Sodkhuu   MPRP   5,481  40.50 
35. D.Dondog   MPRP   6,672  53.72 
36. M.Zenee   MPRP   6,159  67.85 
37. Ts.Uuld   MPRP   6,571  57.86 
38. N.Enkhbold   MPRP   5,750  58.93 
39. Ts.Nyamdorj   MPRP   6,355  63.5 
40. N.Bayartsaikhan  MPRP   9,192  65.76 
41. Ch.Avdai   MPRP   7,729  54.07 
42. Ts.Damiran   MPRP   4,803  47.63 
43. G,Nyamdavaa   MPRP   9,552  66.31 
44. D.Demberel   MPRP   7,161  47.71 
45. L.Gundalai   Independent  5,196  41.57 
46. U.Enkhtuvshin  MPRP   6,603  46.12 
47. E.Gombojav   MPRP   7,445  51.9  
48. L.Tserenjav   MPRP   6,723  43.9 
49. D.Arvin   MPRP   4,584  44.61 
50. N.Ganbyamba   MPRP   5,491  49.05 
51. U.Khurelsukh   MPRP   5,509  54.77 
52. B.Battulga   MPRP   4,929  47.47 
53. D.Tseveenjav   MPRP   4,493  46.39 
54. L.Davaatsedev  MPRP   6,000  53.23 
55. Yo.Bayarsaikhan  MPRP   6,858  44.95 
56. Ts.Nyam-Osor  MPRP   6,267  48.7 
57. T.Gandi   MPRP   7,999  50.49 
58. R.Amarsaikhan  MPRP   8,831  56.23 
59. R.Gavaa   MPRP   9,932  53.11 
60. H.Balsandorj   MPRP   6,877  38.05 
61. B.Erdenebat   MDNSP  5,517  40.52 
62. G.Turtogtokh   MPRP   8,206  51.15 
63. O.Suren   MPRP   6,186  50.58 
64. A.Shagdarsuren  MPRP   7,618  53.84 
65. N.Enkhbayar   MPRP   8,915  62.18 
66. J.Byambadorj   MPRP   7,778  63.70 
67. D.Altai   MPRP   7,982  50.49  
68. Ts.Baasanjav   MPRP   8,929  59.50 
69. N.Bolormaa   MPRP   7,150  54.30 
70. Ts.Dashdorj   MPRP   6,637  51.71  
71. N.Sodnomdorj  MPRP   6,195  54.95 
72. S.Tumur   MPRP   5,961  47.91 
73. T.Ochirkhuu   MPRP   6,721  43.73 
74. N.Gerelsuren   MPRP   5,283  48.94 
75. A.Bazarkhuu   MPRP   5,459  56.94 
76. D.Murun   MPRP   9,435  62.26 
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Table 4 
Parliamentary Election 2004: MPs Elected  
Name of the MP Gender190 Party   Votes  % of Vote 
1.  R.Gonchigdorj  male   Coalition DP   10,107  62.68 
2.  N.Batbayar  male   Coalition DP   8,309  57.83 
3.  S.Lambaa   male   Coalition DP   6,883  52.14 
4.  A.Murat   male   Coalition DP   8,203  54.45 
5.  A.Bake  male   Coalition DP  7,199  52.72 
6.  K.Sairan  male   Coalition DP  8,324  53.79 
7.  G.Zandanshatar male   MPRP   8,104  59.66 
8.  Ts.Jargal  male   Coalition MDNSP 6,205  52.38  
9.  H.Battulga  male   Coalition CW  RP 6,704  56.63 
10. Ch.Radnaa male   MPRP   9,031  63.64 
11. Ts.Tsengel male   MPRP   8,569  67.31 
12. T.Ochirhuu male   MPRP   9,229  61.97 
13. A.Tsanjid   male   MPRP   7,812  54.88 
14. L.Odonchimed male   MPRP   8,785  64.58 
15. Ts.Sharavdorj male   MPRP   9,724  55.90 
16. D.Odbayar male   MPRP   4,087  50.74 
17. M.Zorigt  male   Coalition CWP 7,208  53.32 
18. J.Bathuyag male   Coalition DP  5,195  46.39 
19. R.Rash   male   MPRP   7,136  56.22 
20. J.Narantsatsralt male   Coalition DP  6,298  59.56 
21. Ch.Sodnomtseren male   Coalition DP  6,051  50.59 
22. D.Tuya  female  MPRP   7,575  61.41 
23. Ya.Sanjmyatav male   Independent/DP 4,570  34.33 
24. Z.Enkhbold male   Coalition DP  Result not complete 
25. G.Batkhuu  male   Coalition DP   7,773  67.33 
26. D.Lundeejantsan male   MPRP   7,170  60.38 
27. R.Badamdamdin male   Coalition DP  7,826  54.42 
28. D.Bat-Erdene male   Coalition DP  6,922  56.17 
29. Ts.Bayarsaikhan male   Coalition DP  5,774  51.49 
30. Ch.Ulaan  male   MPRP   10,129  78.20 
31. R.Bud  male   MPRP   9,003  59.10 
32. Sa.Bayartsogt male   Coalition DP  8,500  55.76 
33. R.Nyamsuren male   MPRP   7,503  52.22 
                                                
Source: General Election Commission of Mongolia website: http://www.gec.gov.mn/ (Retrieved  12 
August 2004.) 
Gender and age data available only for 2004 parliamentary election results. 
Avarege MPs age is 45 years old. 
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34. E.Bat-Uul  male   Coalition DP  6,241  49.78 
35. D.Dondog  male   MPRP   6,328  54.67 
36. S.Batbold  male   MPRP   3,985  50.79 
37. Ts.Sukhbaatar male   MPRP   5,307  58.41 
38. N. Enkhbold male   MPRP   5,780  62.20 
39. Ts.Nyamdorj male   MPRP   7,497  68.52 
40. B.Erdenesuren male   MPRP   7,206  51.7 
41. Ch.Avdai  male   MPRP   6,676  52.77 
42. Ts.Damiran male   MPRP   4,996  43.28 
43. L.Purevdorj male   MPRP   7,758  57.42 
44. D.Demberel male   MPRP   6,946  50.37 
45. L.Gundalai male   Coalition DP  7,984  63.8 
46. O.Enkhsaikhan male   Coalition DP  6,786  51.79 
47. M.Enkhsaikhan male   Coalition DP  8,507  59.00 
48. B.Erdenebat male   Coalition MDNSP 10,015  62.7 
49. D.Arvin    male   MPRP   5,289  51.20 
50. B.Bat-erdene  male   MPRP   6,343  52.43 
51. U.Hurelsukh male   MPRP   4,748  50.87 
52. L.Gansukh male   Coalition DP  7,406  54.93 
53. M.Sonompil male   Coalition DP  7,700  62.8 
54. B.Tserenbaljir male   Coalition MDNSP 6,242  51.26 
55. D.Odhuu  male   Independent DP 9,251  46.17 
56. G.Adya  male   MPRP   6,988  50.83 
57. T.Gandi  female   MPRP   9,429  44.43 
58. D.Ganhuyag male   Coalition DP  11,073  47.09 
59. Results not completed yet 
60. S.Otgonbayar male   Coalition MDNSP 9,789  43.52 
61. N. Bayartsaikhan male   MPRP   7,469  51.88 
62. D.Idevkhten male   MPRP   11,405  52.89 
63. B.Munkhtuya female  Coalition DP  6,365  51.64 
64. R.Amarjargal male   Independent DP 7,685  47.64 
65. N.Enkhbayar male   MPRP   8,273  53.80 
66. B.Batbaatar male   Coalition DP  5,948  50.34 
67. T.Badamjunai male   MPRP   17,238  64.17 
68. D.Terbishdagva male   MPRP   13,771  63.13 
69. S. Oyun  female  Coalition CWP 8,112  56.9 
70. B. Jargalsaikhan male   RP    5,849  43.72 
71. B.Batbayar male   Coalition DP  5,931  58.82 
72. R.Erdeneburen male   Coalition MDNSP 8,943  52.88 
73. Ts.Bataa  male   Coalition DP  10,513  51.32 
74. Ts.Munkh-Orgil male   MPRP   6,243  54.87 
75. S.Batbold  male   MPRP   5,896  53.29 
76. L.Gantumur male   Coalition DP   10,768  50.79  
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Appendix VII: Composition of the Cabinets 1992-2004  
 
Table 1 
 
 
The 1992 Government of Mongolia: 16 ministries 
 
Prime Minister       P.Jasrai 
Minister of Foreign Affairs      Ts.Gombosuren 
Minister of Construction and City Building    Ts.Damiran 
Minister of Justice       N.Luvsanjav 
Minister of Finance       D.Davaasambuu 
Minister of Defense         Sh.Jadambaa 
Minister of Infrastructure          B.Jigjid 
Minister of Education and Science      N.Ulziihutag/ S.Tumur-Ochir (May1995) 
Minister of Environment      Z.Batjargal 
Minister of Food and Agriculture     Ts.Uuld 
Minister of Fuel and Energy       B.Jigjid 
Minister of Industry and Trade     Ts.Tsogt 
Minister of Population Policy and Labor    E.Gombojav 
Minister of Health       P.Nyamdavaa 
Minister of Culture       N.Enkhbayar 
Minister of Road, Transportation and Communication     R.Sandalhan  
Minister of Geology and Natural Resource     Ts. Bayarsaikhan 
 
Speaker of the Parliament       N.Bagabandi 
 
State Great Hural Standing Committees: 
The SGH has Standing Committees dealing with specific fields and also determines the 
competence, structure and procedures of those Committees. 
 
On 21 July, 1992 SGH approved ten Standing Committees.   Chair 
Standing Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy D.Lundeejantsan 
Standing Committee on Environment and Rural Development  Ch.Khurts 
Standing Committee on Education, Culture and Science  J.Batsuuri 
Standing Committee on Population, Health, Social Welfare  G.Zuunai 
Standing Committee on Budget, Finance, Monetary & Loan Policy A.Bazarkhuu 
Standing Committee on Legal Affairs    S.Tumur 
Standing Committee on Internal Affairs    S.Chuluunbaatar 
                                                
 Source: Mongolian Government website:  http://www.open-government.mn (Retrieved  Jan 2003-Aug 
2004) 
The State Great Hural, Parliament website: http://www.parl.gov.mn (Retrieved  December 2003) 
Gender and age data available only for 2004 government. 
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Standing Committee on Economic Development, Infrastructure G.Tserendavga 
Standing Committee on Food and Agriculture   J.Norovsambuu 
Standing Committee on Session, Administration   D.Dashtseden 
 
On 12 January, 1995 these committees were trimmed down into 5 committees: 
Standing Committee on Social Policy    B.Demberel 
Standing Committee on Budget, Finance, Monetary & Loan Policy A.Bazarkhuu 
Standing Committee on Agricultural Policy and Environment M.Dalaikhuu 
Standing Committee on Legal Affairs    Ts.Sharavdorj 
Standing Committee on Economic Policy    J.Delgertsetseg 
 
 
Table 2  
     
A. The 1996 Government of Mongolia: four different cabinets 
 
On 19 July, 1996 SGH approved Mendsaikhan Enkhsaikhan as  Prime Minister and he 
assigned the following ministers ( 9 cabinet members). 
 
Prime Minister       M.Enkhsaikhan 
 
Minister of Justice       J.Amarsanaa 
Minister of Finance       P.Tsagaan 
Minister of Defense         D.Dorlijjav 
Minister of Education           Ch.Lkhagvajav 
Minister of Environment      Ts.Adiyasuren 
Minister of Health and Social Welfare    L.Zorig 
Minister of Infrastructure Development    G.Nyamdavaa 
 
Speaker of the Parliament       R.Gonchogdorj 
Vice-Speaker of the Parliament      Ts.Elbegdorj 
 
State Great Hural Standing Committees: 
 
On 24 July, 1996 SGH approved Standing Committees.  Chair 
Standing Committee on Social Policy    H.Hulan 
Standing Committee on State Structure    S.Zorig 
Standing Committee on Budget, Finance, Loan Policy A.Ganbaatar/Da.Ganbold (2 Sep) 
Standing Committee on Legislation     S.Batchuluun 
Standing Committee on Agricultural Policy and Environment Ts.Bayarsaikhan 
 
Later these committees expanded into these committees:  Chair 
Standing Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy S.Zorig 
                                                
  Source:  International Republican Institute. Mongolia Parliament Election Observation Mission Report. 
(Washington D.C: IRI, July, 2000) 
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Standing Committee on Environment and Rural Development Ts.Bayarsaikhan 
Standing Committee on Social Policy    H.Hulan 
Standing Committee on State Structure    D.Battulga 
Standing Committee on Budget     A.Ganbaatar 
Standing Committee on Legal Affairs    Ch.Otgonbayar 
Standing Committee on Economy     Da.Ganbold  
    
B. The April 1998 Government of Mongolia  
 
 On 24 April, 1998 SGH appointed Thahiagin Elbegdorj as Prime Minister and he 
assigned the following ministers ( 7 cabinet members). 
 
Prime Minister       Ts.Elbegdorj 
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs      R.Amarjargal 
Minister of Justice       S.Batchuluun 
Minister of Finance       B.Batbayar 
Minister of Agriculture      N.Altankhuyag 
Minister of Environment      S.Bayartsogt 
Minister of Health and Social Welfare    Sha.Batbayar 
Minister of Infrastructure Development    S.Zorig 
 
 
C. The November 1998 Government of Mongolia 
 
In November 1998 President agreed Ulaanbaatar city mayor Janlavin Narantsatsralt as 
Prime Minister and assigned the following ministers ( 9 cabinet members). 
 
Prime Minister       J.Narantsatsralt 
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs      N.Tuya 
Minister of Justice       L.Tsog 
Minister of Defense       Sh.Tuvdendorj 
Minister of Finance       Ya.Ochir-Sukh 
Minister of Agriculture and Industry     Ch.Sodnomtseren 
Minister of Environment      S.Mendsaikhan 
Minister of Health and Social Welfare    S.Sonin 
Minister of Infrastructure      G.Batkhuu 
Minister of Education       A.Battur 
 
Vice-Speaker of the Parliament     Do.Ganbold (12 Nov, 1998) 
 
                                                
  Source:  International Republican Institute. Mongolia Parliament Election Observation Mission Report. 
(Washington D.C: IRI, July, 2000) 
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D. The 1999 Government of Mongolia 
 
In September 1999 SGH appointed Rinchinnyamin Amarjargal as Prime Minister and he 
kept the 9 cabinet members. 
 
Table 3  
 
The 2000 Government of Mongolia: 11 ministries 
Prime Minister       N.Enkhbayar 
 
Member of Cabinet and Government Chancellor   Ц.Enkhtuvshin 
Minister of Foreign Affairs      L.Erdenechuluun 
Minister of Justice and Interior Affairs    Ts.Nyamdorj 
Minister of Finance and Economy     Ch.Ulaan 
Minister of Defense         J.Gurragchaa 
Minister of Infrastructure          B.Jigjid 
Minister of Education, Culture and Science    A.Tsanjid  
Minister of Environment      U.Barsbol 
Minister of Food and Agriculture     D.Nasanjargal 
Minister of Industry and Trade     Ch.Ganzorig 
Minister of Social Welfare and Labor    Sh.Batbayar 
Minister of Health       P.Nyamdavaa 
 
Speaker of the Parliament    L.Enebish/ S.Tumur-Ochir (reappointed) 
 
 
State Great Hural Standing Committees:     Chair 
 
Standing Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy D.Lundeejantsan 
- Special Auditing Sub-Committee     D.Bazarsad 
Standing Committee on Environment and Rural Development  Sh.Gungaadorj 
Standing Committee on Social Policy    T.Gandi 
Standing Committee on State Structure    D.Demberel 
 - Sub-Committee on Ethics     L.Gundalai 
 - Sub-Committee on Local Self-Governance   R.Tsogtbaatar 
Standing Committee on Budget     N.Bayartsaikhan 
 - Sub-Committee on Budget Expenditure Control  D.Tseveenjav 
                                                
  Source:  International Republican Institute. Mongolia Parliament Election Observation Mission Report. 
(Washington D.C: IRI, July, 2000) 
 Source: Mongolian Government website:  http://www.open-government.mn (Retrieved  Jan 2003) 
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Standing Committee on Legislation     Ts.Sharavdorj 
 - Sub-Committee on Human Rights    S.Tumur 
Standing Committee on Economic Policy    T.Ochirkhuu 
Table 4  
 
The 2004 Government of Mongolia: 13 ministries 
Prime Minister      Ts. Elbegdorj  41, male 
 
Government Deputy Premier    Ch. Ulaan  50, male 
Chairman of Government Secretariat   S. Bayartsogt  37, male 
Cabinet Minister for Disaster Issues    U. Hurelsukh  36, male 
Cabinet Minister for Professional Control   I.Erdenebaatar  40, male 
Minister of Environment    U. Barsbold   40, male 
Minister of Construction and City Building  N. Batbayar   44, male 
Minister of Education, Culture and Science   P. Tsagaan  50, male 
Minister of Defense      B. Erdenebat   45, male 
Minister of Foreign Affairs     Ts. Munkh-Orgil 40, male 
Minister of Road, Transportation and Tourism  G. Bathuu   44, male 
Minister of Social Welfare and Labor   Ts. Bayarsaikhan 42, male 
Minister of Finance      N. Altanhuyag  46, male 
Minister of Industry and Trade    Su. Batbold  40, male 
Minister Justice and Internal Affairs    Ts. Nyamdorj   48, male 
Minister of Food and Agriculture    D. Terbishdagva 49, male 
Minister of Fuel and Energy     T. Ochirhuu   56, male 
Minister of Health      T. Gandi  43, female 
 
Speaker of the Parliament     N.Enkhbayar  46, male 
Vice-Speaker of the Parliament    D.Lundeejantsan(MPRP) 47, male 
Vice-Speaker of the Parliament    S.Oyun (MDC) 40, female 
 
 
State Great Hural Standing Committees:    Chair 
 
Standing Committee on Security and Foreign Policy M. Enkhsaikhan (MDC) 
Standing Committee on Social Policy   S. Lambaa (MDC) 
Standing Committee on Budget    R. Badamdamdin (MDC) 
 - Sub-Committee on Budget Expenditure Control G. Zandanshatar (MPRP)  
Standing Committee on Nature, Environment, Rural Development  Ch. Radnaa (MPRP 
Standing Committee on State Structure   S. Batbold (MPRP) 
- Sub-Committee on Ethics    L. Gantumur (MDC) 
- Sub-Committee on Self-Governance  A. Murat (MDC) 
Standing Committee on Legislation    D. Odbayar (MPRP) 
- Sub-Committee on Human Rights   Ts. Jargal (MDC) 
                                                
  Source: Mongolian Government website:  http://www.open-government.mn (Retrieved Dec 2004) 
The State Great Hural, Parliament website: http://www.parl.gov.mn (Dec Aug 2004) 
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Standing Committee on Economic Policy   Ts. Damiran (MPRP) 
